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“Unheard-of Brutality”: Russian Atrocities against Civilians
in East Prussia, 1914–1915*
Alexander Watson
Goldsmiths, University of London
OnAugust 11, 1914, a week and a half after war had broken out betweenGermany
and Russia, a terriﬁed crowd from the East Prussian border village of Radszen
appeared at the ofﬁce of the local district administrator. That morning, the people
told him, there had been a clash between a German cavalry patrol and a larger
Russian force in their village. When the Germans withdrew, the Russians had
burned down almost every building and had “begun to beat us and to shoot at
us.” Four villagers had been killed, ﬁve wounded; the rest had ﬂed in panic.1
Similar accounts of violence against civilians multiplied once border skirmishes
gave way to full-scale invasion in the middle of August. As tsarist troops poured
across East Prussia’s eastern and southern borders, penetrating deep into its
interior, frightening reports of civilians tortured and murdered, ofﬁcials arrested,
and farms and villages set ablaze attracted the attention of state authorities.2 On
the eve of the Battle of Tannenberg, as East Prussia’s fate hung in the balance, the
Reich’s alarmed deputy chancellor, Clemens Delbrück, telegraphed the Prussian
government from Army General Headquarters: “Russians annihilating property
and lives of population in the occupied areas with unheard-of brutality.”3
This article examines whether East Prussia did, in fact, suffer “unheard-of bru-
tality” at Russian hands during the invasions of 1914–15. German complaints
*I am extremely grateful to audiences at Trinity College, Dublin, Cambridge Univer-
sity, Leeds University, the Institute of Historical Research, London, and the Freie Uni-
versität Berlin; to Peter Lieb and Peter Holquist; and also to the Journal’s four anonymous
referees for their exceptionally insightful and helpful comments on earlier versions of this
article. The work was funded by a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship and by a
Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship within the Seventh European Community Frame-
work Programme ðPIEF-GA-2010-274914Þ. The views expressed in this article are solely
those of the author.
1 Report by the Landrat ðdistrict administratorÞ of Stallupönen, August 11, 1914. The
Landrat wrote again three days later to correct the villagers’ inﬂated casualty estimates of
eight killed and three wounded. Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin
ðhereafter GStA, BerlinÞ: XX. HA Rep. 2II, 3559, fols. 5 and 13.
2 Report by Regierungspräsident Gumbinnen, August 27, 1914. GStA, Berlin: XX.HA
Rep. 2II, 3559, fols. 20–22.
3 Delbrück to Königliches Staatsministerium, August 26, 1914. GStA, Berlin: I. HA
Rep. 90 A, 1059.
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about the tsarist army’s violence toward civilians never attracted much sympa-
thy. For both international opinion at the time and historians today, they were
Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia 781always overshadowed by the “atrocities” that, as John Horne and Alan Kramer
conclusively demonstrated a decade ago, the Germans themselves perpetrated in
Belgium and France.4 Indeed, until very recently, the consensus was that stories
of the “Cossack terror” in East Prussia were mostly propaganda fabrications.
While looting and even destruction have sometimes been acknowledged, sys-
tematic violence against civilians, and especially killing, has been regarded as
uncharacteristic of the Russian invasions.5 Work by Vėjas Gabriel Liulevičius
and Peter Hoeres has begun to question this view but, based on wartime and
postwar publications rather than archival sources, has not disproved it.6
Understanding what took place in East Prussia in 1914–15 is important for two
reasons. First, the Russian army’s conduct in this campaign offers a much-needed
point of comparison with which to test theories of German military exceptional-
ism. Current historiography argues that imperial German military culture was
uniquely prone to promote violence against civilians. For Horne and Kramer, it
was the force’s institutional memory of ﬁghting francs-tireurs in 1870–71, its
operational doctrine that regarded armed civilians as illegitimate combatants, and
the “militarist nationalism” that allegedly permeated its ofﬁcer corps that pre-
pared the way for its slaughter of 6,427 Belgian and French citizens in 1914.7
Isabel V. Hull posits that military culture was not just inﬂuential but even de-
terministic in shaping German conduct. “Standard operating procedures” and “ba-
sic assumptions” overvaluing force and encouraging control mania were per-
petuated and reinforced without challenge owing to the army’s constitutional
exemption from external oversight. This, she argues, strengthened the force’s
4 John Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities 1914: A History of Denial ðNew
Haven, CT, 2001Þ.
5 See Imanuel Geiss, “Die Kosaken kommen! Ostpreußen im August 1914,” in
Imanuel Geiss, Das Deutsche Reich und der Erste Weltkrieg ðMunich, 1978Þ, 58–66.
Also, Horne and Kramer, German Atrocities, 78–81.
6 See Vėjas Gabriel Liulevičius, “Ostpreußen,” in Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg, ed.
Gerhard Hirschfeld, Gerd Krumeich, Irina Renz, andMarkus Pöhlmann ðPaderborn, 2003,
2004Þ, 764–76, and Liulevičius, “Precursors and Precedents: Forced Migration in North-
eastern Europe during the First World War,” Nordost-Archiv: Zeitschrift für Regional-
geschichte, n.s., 14 ð2005Þ: 32–52, 39; Peter Hoeres, “Die Slawen: Perzeptionen des
Kriegsgegners bei den Mittelmächten; Selbst- und Feindbild,” in Die vergessene Front:
Der Osten 1914/15; Ereignis, Wirkung, Nachwirkung, ed. Gerhard P. Groß ðPaderborn,
2006Þ, 187–91. Robert Traba’s recent study of East Prussian identity attempts unsuccess-
fully to reconcile the different views. See Robert Traba, “Wschodniopruskość”: Tożsa-
mość regionalna i narodowa w kulturze politycznej Niemiec ðPoznań, 2005Þ, esp. 27–33.
7 Horne and Kramer, German Atrocities, 74 and chaps. 3 and 4. A far cruder cultural
explanation attributing the violence to a dysfunctional prewar German societal “Kultur” of
“militarism, nationalism, and materialism” is put forward by Jeff Lipkes in Rehearsals:
The German Army in Belgium, August 1914 ðLeuven, 2007Þ, 563–74.
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lethal tendency to instrumentalize civilians and set it on a course of repeated and
increasingly dysfunctional violence, predisposing it to commit acts of extreme
782 Watsonbrutality against enemy populations.8 A lack of comparable research on other
militaries means, however, that the allegedly exceptional nature of German mil-
itary culture and atrocities remains highly questionable. Through an examination
of Russian conduct in East Prussia, this article will help to ascertain whether the
killing of noncombatants was a speciﬁcally German practice or a more general
characteristic of early twentieth-century European warfare.9
Second, the invasions of East Prussia are important for their impact on Ger-
many during the First World War. Historians have studied the military campaign
of August 1914 and recognized its political signiﬁcance: victory at Tannenberg
won the German general Paul von Hindenburg immense popularity and prestige,
setting him and his chief of staff, Erich Ludendorff, on a precipitate ascent that
culminated in their leadership of the German army and nation during 1916–18.10
By contrast, the invasions’ inﬂuence on German societal understandings of the
conﬂict and “war culture” has been largely overlooked. Troy R. E. Paddock has
demonstrated that by 1914 an image of the tsarist empire as Asiatic, autocratic,
aggressive, and barbaric was ﬁrmly anchored in German public consciousness.11
Yet neither histories of the popular mobilization at the war’s outbreak nor the
standard works on the Kaiserreich’s war effort consider how the German people
8 Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in
Imperial Germany ðIthaca, NY, 2005Þ. The atrocities of 1914 are discussed as evidence for
Hull’s broader argument on 207–15.
9 The only comparable study is Jonathan Gumz’s work on the Habsburg invasion of
Serbia, which suggests that the Austro-Hungarian army executed 3,500 Serb civilians in a
matter of weeks, making the violence there of greater intensity than that of the Germans in
Belgium and France. See Jonathan Gumz, The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in
Habsburg Serbia, 1914–1918 ðCambridge, 2009Þ, 44–59. Some excellent research under-
taken recently on the tsarist army’s conduct in Galicia in 1914–15 demonstrates that
pogroms and mass deportations were perpetrated there against Jewish communities.
Unfortunately, however, it provides less information on atrocities against gentile popula-
tions and gives no ﬁgures for overall fatalities. See Alexander V. Prusin, Nationalizing a
Borderland: War, Ethnicity, and Anti-Jewish Violence in East Galicia, 1914–1920 ðTus-
caloosa, AL, 2005Þ; Frank M. Schuster, Zwischen allen Fronten: Osteuropäische Juden
während des Ersten Weltkrieges ð1914–1919Þ ðCologne, 2004Þ; Peter Holquist, “The Role
of Personality in the First ð1914–1915Þ Russian Occupation of Galicia and Bukovina,” in
Anti-Jewish Violence: Rethinking the Pogrom in East European History, ed. Jonathan
Dekel-Chen,DavidGaunt,NatanM.Meir, andIsraelBartal ðBloomington, IN,2010Þ, 52–73;
and Eric Lohr, “TheRussianArmy and the Jews:Mass Deportation, Hostages, andViolence
during World War I,” Russian Review 60 ð2001Þ: 404–19.
10 See esp. Anna von der Goltz, Hindenburg: Power, Myth, and the Rise of the Nazis
ðOxford, 2009Þ, 14–42. The deﬁnitive military history is Dennis E. Showalter, Tannen-
berg: Clash of Empires ðHamden, CT, 1991Þ.
11 Troy R. E. Paddock, Creating the Russian Peril: Education, the Public Sphere, and
National Identity in Imperial Germany, 1890–1914 ðRochester, NY, 2010Þ.
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reacted to the arrival of troops from this feared neighbor on their national soil.12
This appears to be a major omission; research has shown that invasion often
Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia 783elicits intense emotions of outrage, violation, and victimhood that act as powerful
sponsors of national unity.13 This article will argue that invasion must be given a
central place in any account of the country’s wartime history that aims to un-
derstand the success of Germany’s mobilization in 1914 and its people’s subse-
quent resilience.
This investigation is based principally on the wartime records of the East
Prussian civil administration, previously thought destroyed.14 The province of
East Prussia was headed by a senior president ðOberpräsidentÞ, whose ﬁles on
“Russian atrocities” ðRussengreuelÞ have survived intact.15 Among the records of
its three counties ðRegierungenÞ, those of Allenstein County appear also to be
largely complete; some documentation remains from Gumbinnen and Königs-
berg Counties as well. These papers include eyewitness and victim testimony and
reports by state and church ofﬁcials collected by the administration during its own
inquiries into Russian military crimes. In addition, the article draws on one post-
war source: a semiofﬁcial study of the invasions written byDr. Fritz Gause, a high
school teacher and later director of the Königsberg city archive and historical
museum.16 There are good reasons to regard Gause’s work with suspicion. His
12 Thomas Raithel, Das “Wunder” der inneren Einheit: Studien zur deutschen und
französischen Öffentlichkeit bei Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges ðBonn, 1996Þ, and Jeffrey
Verhey, The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth, and Mobilization in Germany ðCambridge,
2000Þ. Verhey devotes two pages to East Prussia ð90–91Þ, and Raithel mentions East
Prussia only brieﬂy while discussing German perceptions of the Russian enemy ð320 and
330Þ. For standard histories’ treatment of the invasions, see Roger Chickering, Imperial
Germany and the Great War, 1914–1918, 2nd ed. ðCambridge, 2004Þ, 24, 26–27, and 99;
Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914–1918
ðLondon, 1997Þ, 80–87, and 128. An essay by Peter Jahn does explore how German
popular perceptions of Russia were inﬂuenced by the invasion, but it errs in underestimat-
ing its violence. See Peter Jahn, “‘Zarendreck, Barbarendreck’—Die russische Besetzung
Ostpreußens 1914 in der deutschen Öffentlichkeit,” in Verführungen der Gewalt: Russen
und Deutsche im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Karl Eimermacher and Astrid Volpert
ðMunich, 2005Þ, 223–41.
13 See, for example, Jean-Jacques Becker, The Great War and the French People
ðLeamington Spa, 1985Þ, 3–5 and 324, andHorne andKramer,GermanAtrocities, chap. 8.
Also, Catherine Merridale, Ivan’s War: The Red Army 1939–45 ðLondon, 2005Þ, 78–86.
14 See Liulevičius, “Precursors and Precedents,” 39.
16 Fritz Gause, Die Russen in Ostpreußen 1914/15: Im Auftrage des Landeshaupt-
manns der Provinz Ostpreußen ðKönigsberg, 1931Þ. For Gause’s life and career, see the
15 Comparison of today’s archival holdings with a survey of documentation pertaining
to the invasions published in 1930 indicates that ofﬁcial provincial records have had a high
rate of survival. The 1930 survey mentioned four volumes devoted to Russian atrocities
among the ﬁles of the Oberpräsident. I located ﬁve such volumes, two of which are now in
Berlin and three in Olsztyn, Poland. See Fritz Gause, “Die Quellen zur Geschichte des
Russeneinfalls in Ostpreußen im Jahre 1914,” Altpreußische Forschungen 7 ð1930Þ: 82–
106, esp. 86.
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book was published in 1931, a time when East Prussia was stranded beyond the
Reich’s border and when emphasizing the province’s wartime suffering was a
784 Watsonmeans of reinforcing German claims over the territory. Moreover, according to
the book’s preface, the work’s “spiritual father”was Professor Albert Brackmann,
a man now best remembered as a senior Ostforscher, one of the Nazis’ academic
collaborators.17 Nonetheless, cross-checks with the existing archival evidence
reveal that Gause’s study was a sound piece of historical research. As he utilized
some important material that has since been destroyed, it is a valuable supplement
to surviving provincial records.
The investigation described here is organized into four parts. The ﬁrst sketches
the course of the invasions, while the second examines the atrocity inquiries
conducted in their aftermath. The third part analyzes patterns of Russian violence
and compares themwith those of contemporaneous German atrocities in the west.
Finally, the fourth part examines the impact of the invasions on the German
people and how these experiences affected their readiness to ﬁght the twentieth
century’s ﬁrst “total war.”
I
When Germany declared war on Russia on August 1, 1914, there can have been
few among the two million inhabitants of East Prussia who felt no apprehension.
People had begun to leave the border areas already at the end of July. Karol
Małłek, a native of the Masurian village Brodowen, recalled that when mobili-
zation was announced, “everybody cried and wailed.”18 The province, faced on
two sides by Russian territory, was frighteningly vulnerable to attack ðﬁg. 1Þ.
Although the Prussian war minister had publicly insisted a year earlier that
“neither in East Prussia nor elsewhere is a surrender of German land considered,”
the army had allotted just eleven infantry divisions and a cavalry division, a mere
tenth of its available forces, to its defense.19 There was little in the region of such
catalog description for 456/3—“Nachlaß von Fritz Gause,” in GStA, Berlin. Five years
before his death in 1973, Gause was awarded the title of Professor by the state government17 Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 9. For Brackmann’s relations with the Nazis, see
Michael Burleigh, “Albert Brackmann ð1871–1952Þ Ostforscher: The Years of Retire-
ment,” Journal of Contemporary History 23 ð1988Þ: 573–88.
18 Karol Małłek, Z Mazur do Verdun: Wspomnienia 1890–1919 ðn.p., 1967Þ, 176. For
refugees, see Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 40. A good description of the rising anxiety felt
in Allenstein, one of the province’s major cities, during the period surrounding the war’s
outbreak is given in a report by Polizeiinspektor Schroeder½?, April 15, 1915. Archiwum
PaństwowewOlsztynie ðhereafter APOlsztynÞ: AktaMiasta Olsztyn 259/168, fols. 16–17.
19 Hew Strachan, The First WorldWar: To Arms, 3 vols. ðOxford, 2001Þ, 1:316. For the
quotation, see report of Oberpräsident der Provinz Ostpreußen ðhereafter OberpräsidentÞ
toMinister des Innern, September 15, 1914. GStA, Berlin: XX. HARep. 2II, 3776, reverse
of fol. 200.
of Nordrhein-Westfalen.
This content downloaded from 158.223.21.100 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 10:02:11 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Fig. 1.—The province of East Prussia, with counties ðRegierungenÞ and districts
ðLandkreiseÞ. Adapted from Albert Hesse and Herbert Goeldel, Die Bevölkerung von
Ostpreußen, Grundlagen des Wirtschaftslebens von Ostpreußen. Denkschrift zum Wieder-
aufbau der Provinz, ed. Johannes Hansen et al. ðJena, 1916Þ, 3:25.
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economic value that it could not at least temporarily be relinquished. The
population, largely German, but including a 337,300-strong Polish-speaking
786 WatsonMasurian minority in the south and 112,500 Lithuanians in the northeast, mostly
worked in agriculture and was poor by national standards. It was also scattered:
almost half of the inhabitants lived in villages of fewer than 500 people. The
province possessed just four self-governing cities, and three of these—Allenstein,
Insterburg, and Tilsit—had only 30,000 to 40,000 inhabitants. The sole major
municipality, with almost a quarter of a million citizens, was the heavily fortiﬁed
provincial capital of Königsberg.20
East Prussia suffered two invasions and a destructive raid in 1914–15. The ﬁrst
invasion began in mid-August 1914 and resulted in two-thirds of the province
being brieﬂy overrun. Attack came from two directions: General Pavel Rennen-
kampf ’s First Army, a force of six and a half infantry divisions, ﬁve and a half
cavalry divisions, and 492 guns, advanced from the east on August 15. Five days
later, the forces of the Russian Second Army under General Aleksandr Samsonov—
nine and a half infantry divisions, three cavalry divisions, and 738 guns—crossed
East Prussia’s southeastern border.21 The panic that the invaders’ arrival caused
among the population was exacerbated and spread to still-unthreatened parts of
the province by an ill-considered military order of August 22 instructing civilians
urgently to take their harvest and livestock to safety across the Vistula. Awave
of refugees, comprising hundreds of thousands of frightened people, swept west-
ward, clogging the roads with farm wagons and cattle.22 The civil administration
in areas under assault also evacuated: the president of Gumbinnen County or-
dered his ofﬁcials on August 21 to take refuge in Königsberg, and two days
later his counterpart in Allenstein transferred his ofﬁces to Danzig.23 Mean-
while, German forces struggled to halt the Russian advance. A battle between
20 Albert Hesse and Herbert Goeldel, Die Bevölkerung von Ostpreußen, Grundlagen
des Wirtschaftslebens von Ostpreußen: Denkschrift zum Wiederaufbau der Provinz, ed.
Johannes Hansen et al. ðJena, 1916Þ, 3:1–2, 5–6, and 10. Also, the companion volumes:
Johannes Hansen, Die Landwirtschaft in Ostpreußen, 2:9, and Herbert Goedel, Wohl-
standsverhältnisse in Ostpreußen, 5:19–31. For the minorities, see Leszek Belzyt, Spra-
chliche Minderheiten im preußischen Staat 1815–1914: Die preußische Sprachenstatistik
in Bearbeitung und Kommentar ðMarburg, 1998Þ, 17 and 25.
21 For ﬁgures, see Norman Stone, The Eastern Front 1914–1917 ðLondon, 1975,
1998Þ, 58.
22 For the refugee wave and the so-called Dirschau order ðnamed after the Etappenin-
spection Dirschau, which issued it on the instructions of the Eighth ArmyÞ, see draft report
of Oberpräsident toMinister des Innern, September 15, 1914. GStA, Berlin: XX. HARep.
2II, 3576, fols. 200–204. Also Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 40–59.
23 “Kriegsbericht” of August 21, 1914, by Regierungspräsident Gumbinnen, Au-
gust 22, 1914. GStA, Berlin: XX. HA Rep. 2II, 3559, fol. 16; Telegram of Unterstaats-
sekretär to Reichskanzler, August 24, 1914. Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde ðhereafter
BA Berlin-LichterfeldeÞ: R43/2465d, fol. 5.
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the defending Eighth Army and Rennenkampf’s troops outside Gumbinnen on
August 20 had been inconclusive. However, the Germans then redeployed to
Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia 787face Samsonov in the southwest of the province, preparing the way for the
infamous Battle of Tannenberg. On August 27, they attacked the Russian
general’s left wing, broke through, and in the ﬁnal days of the month surrounded
and annihilated his Second Army, taking 92,000 prisoners and nearly 400 guns.
The crushing victory prompted Rennenkampf, whose advance units had brieﬂy
cut off Königsberg, to halt. Once again shifting their men by rail, the Germans
attacked the First Army at the Battle of the Masurian Lakes on September 7–10,
forcing it into retreat. By September 13, having lost a further 30,000 men as
prisoners, the Russians had withdrawn into their own territory. East Prussia had
been liberated.24
The respite did not last long, however. Throughout October there was heavy
ﬁghting along the borders, and at the beginning of November a second invasion
was undertaken by a new Russian force, the Tenth Army under General Sievers.
The Germans were compelled to abandon their eastern districts and withdraw to
the defensive Angerapp line. This time, unlike in the summer, an orderly evac-
uation of inhabitants from the threatened territory was organized, facilitated by
the gradual nature of the retreat and improved cooperation between military and
civil authorities.25 The Russians captured only one-ﬁfth of the province, but their
occupation lasted for three and a half months. It was not until the “Winter Battle”
of mid-February 1915 that two German armies, attacking Sievers’s ﬂanks in the
north and south, forced him into a hurried retreat.26 After this defeat, tsarist units
trespassed only once more on East Prussian soil. On March 17, 1915, Russian
columns advanced on the province’s most northeasterly district of Memel, taking
the town of the same name. The operation was brief: four days later, the raiders
were thrown out by a German relief force led by the military governor of
Königsberg.27
The Russian invasions caused immense disruption and destruction in East
Prussia. According to ofﬁcial ﬁgures, 41,414 buildings were destroyed and an-
other 60,000 damaged.28 It was estimated that Gumbinnen County alone, where
24 Showalter, Tannenberg, esp. 172–323; Strachan, First World War, 1:319–35; Stone,
Eastern Front, 59–69.25 Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 65–70.
26 Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918: Der Herbst-Feldzug 1914; Im Westen
bis zum Stellungskrieg; Im Osten bis zum Rückzug, 14 vols. ðBerlin, 1929Þ, 5:542–48;
Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918: Der Herbst-Feldzug 1914; Der Abschluß der
Operationen imWesten und Osten, 14 vols. ðBerlin, 1929Þ, 6:324–40 and 347–49; Stone,
Eastern Front, 116–19. For the evacuation, see Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 67–70.
27 Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918: Die Operationen des Jahres 1915; Die
Ereignisse im Winter und Frühjahr, 14 vols. ðBerlin, 1931Þ, 7:282–83.
28 Letter of Oberpräsident to Präsident des Staatsministeriums in Berlin, April 9, 1921,
and table 2 accompanying it. GStA, Berlin: XX. HARep. 2II, 3759, reverse of fols. 56 and
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around one-ﬁfth of the buildings had been wrecked, would require 198 million
bricks for reconstruction.29 Looting and vandalism had also been widespread. In
788 Watsonabandoned homes and shops, ofﬁcials found “furniture and household appliances
smashed, the linen ripped apart, all cupboards emptied, the beds chopped up and
the down scattered, letters and other papers thrown about, walls damaged by
shots ﬁred in fun, windows and doors smashed, merchandise pointlessly wasted,
and the rooms fouled with human excrement.”30 While the Russians were
responsible for much of this, they were not the sole culprits. German soldiers
were also caught thieving.31 Refugees too caused enormous damage; law and
order broke down so badly that in October 1914 special military courts were set
up to dispense justice to civilians plundering in the war zone.32
While the material damage in much of East Prussia was obvious, it was not
immediately clear how the province’s inhabitants had fared at the hands of the
invaders. Was there any truth in the atrocity stories that had begun to circulate in
the panic of August 1914? Ofﬁcials, confronted by chaos, were unable to answer
this question quickly. The population was displaced, infrastructure was damaged,
and the administration needed time to regain control. It would take many months
for painstaking investigations to establish the full extent of the invader’s violence
against civilians.
64. For comparison, 188,981 buildings were destroyed during the Russian campaign in29 Report by Regierungspräsident Gumbinnen to Unterstaatssekretär Heinrichs,
April 21, 1915. GStA, Berlin: I. HA Rep. 90A, 1064, p. 7 of report; also, “Besprechung der
Gumbinner Landräte,” March 1, 1915. AP Olsztyn: Landratsamt Braunsberg ðStarostwo
Powiatowe w BraniewieÞ ðhereafter LA BraunsbergÞ: 10/157, p. 5 of meeting minutes.
30 Report of Regierungspräsident Königsberg, September 16, 1914. GStA, Berlin: XX.
HA Rep. 2II, 3558, fol. 17. For another similar example, see report of Ministerialdirektor
Offenberg, September 16, 1914. GStA, Berlin: I. HA Rep. 90A, 1059, pp. 4–5 of report.
31 See, for example, the “Orders of the Day” issued by the Generalkommandos of
XVII. and XX. Armeekorps, September 1 and 4, 1914. Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv Frei-
burg ðhereafter BA-MA FreiburgÞ: PH5II/186, fols. 81–82 and 97. Also ðfor civilian
complaints that German soldiers had emptied cellarsÞ, see gendarmerie report by Wacht-
meister Sahm I, September 14, 1914. AP Olsztyn: Königlicher Regierungs-President zu
Allenstein ðRejencja OlsztyńskaÞ ðhereafter RPAllensteinÞ: 179, fol. 107.
32 Letter from stellvertretendes Generalkommando des I. Armeekorps to stellvertre-
tendes Generalkommando des VI. Armeekorps, September 2, 1915. Archiwum Państ-
wowe w Katowicach. Oddział w Raciborzu: 18/237/4: 8, fol. 184. During the ﬁrst
invasion, many towns, including Allenstein, Insterburg, and Tilsit, established Bürgerweh-
ren ðcitizens’ patrolsÞ in order to combat local looters.
Galicia in 1914–15. Horne and Kramer estimate that 15,000–20,000 buildings were
deliberately demolished by the Germans during their invasion of Belgium and France in
1914. However, this ﬁgure is not directly comparable to those for East Prussia and Galicia,
as these latter include not only buildings destroyed intentionally but also those ruined
through ﬁghting. See Sprawozdanie c.k. Namiestnictwa, Centrali krajowej dla gospodarc-
zej odbudowy Galicyi za czas od czerwca 1916 do lutego 1917 ðCracow, 1917Þ, 4, and
Horne and Kramer, German Atrocities, 76.
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II
Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia 789The German government was not complacent when reports of Russian atrocities
began to arrive from East Prussia. Already in August 1914 it had issued a dip-
lomatic protest and opened inquiries to ascertain whether tsarist troops had
broken international laws of war.33 Under the Hague Convention of 1907, signed
by Germany and Russia, civilians possessed some, albeit limited, protection.34
Pillaging was strictly forbidden. The convention stipulated too that “the lives of
persons . . . must be respected” and that “undefended” places should not be
subjected to attack or bombardment. Belligerents were allowed neither to force
enemy subjects to participate in operations against their own country nor to
impose collective punishments in retribution for the crimes of individuals.35
Civilians also had obligations, however. Most importantly, the right of resistance
was severely limited: inhabitants were permitted to rise up “spontaneously” only
if their territory was not yet occupied, and arms had to be carried openly.36 The
incentives for proving that Russian forces had contravened the convention
without provocation were twofold. First, there was a ﬁnancial motivation to
catalog damages and identify who had caused them, as Article 3 of the conven-
tion obliged belligerents whose troops violated its provisions to pay compensa-
tion.37 Second, demonstrating Russian brutality in East Prussia was a useful
weapon in the diplomatic war to gain neutrals’ sympathy. It offered a riposte to
the Entente’s damaging accusations ofGerman barbarity inBelgium and France.38
Two atrocity inquiries were organized by the government. First, an investiga-
tive commission was hastily dispatched to East Prussia from Berlin. It issued a
33 For the ofﬁcial protest, see “Deutscher Protest gegen die russische Kriegführung,”
FrankfurterZeitungundHandelsblatt,58.Jahrgang,Nr.228,ErstesMorgenblattðAugust18,
1914Þ, 1.
34 For the development of international law before 1914, see Geoffrey Best, Humanity
in Warfare: The Modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflicts ðLondon,
1980Þ, 128–215. For recent research stressing the limited protection offered by the 1907
Hague Convention, see Amanda Alexander, “The Genesis of the Civilian,” Leiden Journal
of International Law 20 ð2007Þ: 359–76.
35 Articles 28 and 47 ðpillagingÞ, 46 ðrespect livesÞ, 25 ðattack or bombardment of
undefended placesÞ, 23 and 52 ðoperations against own countryÞ, and 50 ðcollective
punishmentÞ of the Annex entitled “Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land” to “Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War in Land. 2d
Peace Conference, The Hague, 18 Oct. 1907. IV,” in Conventions and Declarations
between the Powers Concerning War, Arbitration and Neutrality (Declaration of Paris,
1856—of St.Petersburg,1868—of TheHague,1899—Conventionof Geneva,1906—2d
PeaceConference, TheHague, 1907—Declaration of London, 1909. English—French—
German ðThe Hague, 1915Þ.
36 Ibid., Art. 2 of Annex.
37 Ibid., Art. 3 of Convention.
38 For the role played by atrocity accusations in the struggle for neutral opinion, see
Horne and Kramer, German Atrocities, chap. 6.
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report quickly, in mid-September 1914, arguing that “portrayals of Russian
atrocities and the reported devastation of the land are based on untruths.”39
790 WatsonSecond, on August 28, the Prussian interior minister arranged for a more com-
prehensive probe by instructing the presidents of Allenstein and Gumbinnen
Counties, the two areas that had borne the brunt of the Russian onslaught, to
organize and chair commissions to look into Russian crimes. A similar order was
sent to East Prussia’s third county president in Königsberg on September 12,
1914.40 It may not be coincidental that the minister issued his ﬁrst order on the
day that an ofﬁcial Belgian commission produced its ﬁrst report on German
atrocities.41 Nonetheless, the correspondence between provincial authorities and
Berlin makes it clear that the investigation was intended to be thorough and
objective. The county presidents were told to appoint not only local ofﬁcials but
also “distinguished personages not in state service . . . , who are fully acquainted
with the circumstances of the district.”42 There was no intention of using evidence
of Russian crimes to incite public outrage; the authorities refused requests by
private persons and commercial publishers for information on tsarist troops’
brutality precisely because they feared that it would be exploited for sensationalist
or pornographic purposes.43 Rigor was essential. The commissions’ ﬁndings
would face international scrutiny and needed to be irrefutable.44
The three county presidents submitted their ﬁndings in the autumn of 1914.
Although the reports differed in length and in their use of evidence, they un-
39 Ernst Deuerlein, ed., Briefwechsel Hertling-Lerchenfeld 1912–1917: Dienstliche
Privatkorrespondenz zwischen dem bayerischen Ministerpräsidenten Georg Graf von
Hertling und dem bayerischen Gesandten in Berlin Hugo Graf von und zu Lerchenfeld,
2 vols. ðBoppard am Rhein, 1973Þ, 1:341–42 ðletter of September 14, 1914Þ. See also
letter from württembergischer Militärbevollmächtigter to Staatsminister von Weizsäcker,
September 14, 1914. Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart: E 74 Bü. 465.
40 LettersofMinister des Innern toRegierungspräsidenten,August28andSeptember12,
1914. AP Olsztyn: Oberpräsidium von Ostpreussen ðNaczelne Prezydium Prus
WschodnichÞ ðhereafter OPOstpreußenÞ: 3/528, fols. 5–6.
41 See Horne and Kramer, German Atrocities, 229–61, esp. 229.
42 Letter of Minister des Innern to Regierungspräsidenten, August 28, 1914. AP
Olsztyn: OP Ostpreussen: 3/528, fol. 5.
43 Letter of Regierungspräsident Allenstein to Minister des Innern, October 8, 1914.
See also the requests for material by the Ernst Richter Verlag, Dr. F. Castelle and the Otto
Gustav Zehrfeld Kommissions- und Verlagsbuchhandlung in AP Olsztyn: RPAllenstein:
176, fols. 25–29, 226, 228, and 230.
44 Letter of Minister des Innern to Regierungspräsidenten, August 28, 1914. AP
Olsztyn: OP Ostpreußen: 3/528, fol. 5. An intention to use the evidence to support damage
claims is mentioned here. While the desire to exploit it for the diplomatic war is not
explicitly stated, it is expressed in subsequent correspondence. Some ofﬁcials feared that
the rigor of the research actually damaged the diplomatic impact because it delayed the
appearance of the ofﬁcial report on Russian atrocities until March 1915. See the letters of
Minister des Innern to Regierungspräsidenten, November 18, 1914, and of Oberpräsident
to Rittmeister Graf Lehndorff in Armee-Oberkommando 8, February 28, 1915. AP
Olsztyn: OP Ostpreußen: 3/528, fols. 86–87 and 277–78.
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animously agreed that the invading forces had perpetrated serious crimes against
the East Prussian population. The ﬁrst report was sent from Gumbinnen to the
Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia 791interior minister on September 25. Drawing predominantly on witness testimony
and making no claim to be comprehensive, it recounted beatings, murders, and
executions, as well as massacres in the villages of Seedranken and Christiankeh-
men. Civilians who had refused to betray German troops’ positions had been
harmed or even killed. While the most serious cases were conﬁrmed in their
essentials by subsequent investigation, the report’s reliance on apparently unver-
iﬁed individuals’ statements resulted in the inclusion of several far-fetched and
poorly supported accounts of women, children, and soldiers having been sadis-
tically mutilated.45 The report provided no estimate of total civilian victims. A
press release published around the same time suggests, however, that ofﬁcials
believed more than 360 civilian lives had been lost in Gumbinnen County.46
The other two counties reported one month later, at the end of October.
Königsberg sent only a short note that, while not detailing how evidence had
been compiled, did summarize the investigation’s conclusions in measured tones.
It refused to endorse accounts of mutilation and acknowledged a case in which a
Russian soldier had been shot dead by his ofﬁcer in punishment for the attempted
rape and murder of East Prussian civilians. It nonetheless stated categorically that
the invaders had killed over 200 people in the county “without cause.”47 Allen-
stein’s report was the most thorough and transparent, systematically detailing the
atrocities perpetrated, district by district. It not only recounted witness statements
but also cited the testimony of policemen, foresters, teachers, and priests, up-
standing local ofﬁcials who either had remained at their posts during the invasion
or were ﬁrst on the scene after liberation.48 The research for the report’s section on
45 Gumbinnen County report, September 25, 1914. APOlsztyn: OPOstpreußen: 3/528,
fols. 64–79. Gause’s postwar investigation supported much of the information given in the
reportonkillingsatSeedrankenðfol.69Þ,nearSzittkehmenðfol.71Þ,and inChristiankehmen
ðfol. 78Þ. See Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 212, 160, and 188–89. The mutilation testi-
mony was largely rejected as unconvincing by the authorities: it is signiﬁcant that a docu-
ment on Russian atrocities compiled from the three county reports by the Oberpräsident’s
ofﬁce excluded most of it. See “Bericht über russische Grausamkeiten” ðcovering letter
dated February 28, 1915Þ. AP Olsztyn: OP Ostpreußen: 3/528, fols. 279–96. Gause
categorically rejected claims of mutilation. See Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 230.
46 See “Von den russischenGreueltaten,” dated September 18, 1914, inDergroßeKrieg
1914: Deutschlands Kampf zu Wasser und Land; Eine vollständige Zusammenstellung
von Ereignissen und Dokumenten; Monatsausgabe der Leipziger Abendzeitung; Ein
Erinnerungswerk für lebende und spätere Geschlechter; 2. Heft ð16. September–14. Ok-
tober 1914Þ, 5.
47 Königsberg County report, October 30, 1914. AP Olsztyn: OP Ostpreußen: 3/528,
fols. 40–41.
48 Some of the testimony on which this report was based survives. See, for example,
reports by Oberwachtmeister Meyer, September 17, 1914, and Sekretär Klempin, Septem-
ber 21, 1914, in AP Olsztyn: RPAllenstein: 179, fols. 93–95 and 163–64.
This content downloaded from 158.223.21.100 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 10:02:11 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Lyck, the county’s most severely affected district, was especially impressive. The
district gendarmerie, men who knew their localities intimately, had conducted
792 Watsonextensive investigations very shortly after the liberation; one ofﬁcer recounted
how he himself had located and buried victims’ bodies. This enabled them as
early as September to submit detailed reports showing that 127 men, women, and
children from the district had been killed and around 315 forcibly taken by tsarist
troops.49 Overall, the county report gave details of more than 300 cases of murder
by Russian soldiers. Some killings were apparently random, some were related to
robbery, and others were executions. Men of military age were numerous among
the victims. A fewmale corpses were found damaged, although probably not ma-
levolently. Female fatalities were far rarer but some were reported, as were sexual
assaults. Therewere accounts ofmassacres, notably near the town of Bischofstein
and in the village of Santoppen. The report also asserted that nearly 400 people
had been forcibly deported. These estimates were later raised to 600 killed and
1,000 deported.50
The county commissions convincingly demonstrated that many German civil-
ians had been killed by Russian troops in August and September 1914.51
Nonetheless, the interior minister was not satisﬁed. The reports had failed to
establish that the bloodshed had contravened international law. It was not sufﬁ-
cient, he argued, to state that “a house was burned down or a number of
inhabitants shot”; it also had to be shown that “those shot had not behaved in a
hostile manner toward the Russians, that there was nomilitary reason for destroy-
49 See the twenty-seven gendarmerie reports ðwritten by twenty-three individual
Gendarmerie-WachtmeisterÞ of September 21 and 22, 1914. AP Olsztyn: RP Allenstein:
179, fols. 169–256. The account of locating and burying bodies is in the report of
Gendarmerie-Wachtmeister Freiburg, September 21, 1914, in ibid., fols. 243–48, esp. 244.
When the president of the county requested the reports on September 19, 1914, he appears
not to have expected to be told of fatalities or forced removals. His order ðibid., fol. 237Þ
asks only for information on the return of refugees and ofﬁcials and for details of plunder-
ing, crop damage, and stolen cattle. The casualty ﬁgures have been calculated from a careful
reading of the original reports; the totals given for Lyck in Allenstein County’s report on
atrocities differ slightly ð124 killed and 313 deportedÞ. Similar gendarmerie reports were
written ðor have survivedÞ only for Rössel District ðsee ibid., fols. 19–20, 35, 67–69, 89–95,
105–8Þ.
50 Allenstein County report entitled “Auszüge aus den Akten der Kriegskommission
Allenstein zur Untersuchung Völkerrechtswidriger russischer Grausamkeiten,” Octo-
ber 29, 1914. AP Olsztyn: OP Ostpreußen: 3/528, fols. 43–63. The original typewritten
totals given on fol. 62 ðwhich, in the case of the killed, tallies with the cases detailed in
the reportÞ were written over with new raised estimates in pencil.
51 The commissions’ conclusions were supported by the Evangelical Church in East
Prussia. Reports from its clergy led it to conclude that “at least 500 civilians” had been
killed, and “at least as many carried off to Russia.” See report of Königliches Konsistorium
der Provinz Ostpreußen to Evangelischer Ober-Kirchenrat in Berlin-Charlottenburg, Oc-
tober 23, 1914. GStA, Berlin: I. HA Rep. 90A, 1059, p. 4 of report.
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ing the place.”Moreover, he stressed that in order to ensure reliability, testimony
needed to be taken under oath.52 From early November the courts were therefore
Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia 793directed to assist the commissions, and despite the onset of the second invasion
sworn statements were collected from victims and witnesses during the winter
and through to the autumn of 1916.53 A small selection of this evidence formed
the basis of a long-awaited but disappointing Foreign Ofﬁce report on “Atrocities
of Russian Troops against German Civilians and German Prisoners of War,”
published inMarch 1915.Despite the faith placed in sworn testimony, this “White
Book” included some dubious mutilation stories, omitted many of the worst
examples of the invader’s violence, and failed to state how many East Prussians
had suffered or lost their lives at Russian hands. It was a poor reﬂection of the
work undertaken by the province’s administration.54
In April 1915, only a month after the appearance of the “White Book,” East
Prussian authorities were, by contrast, able to supply comprehensive casualty
estimates. Probably collated by district administrators ðLandräteÞ, these stated
that 1,615 civilians had been killed by the Russians since the war’s outbreak.55 An
even larger number had been forcibly deported. The tsar’s government itself
admitted in the autumn of 1915 to holding 7,000 East Prussians, claiming rather
incredibly that they had chosen to settle in Russia.56 The district administrators
had already calculated in the spring and summer that 10,685 people had been
taken.57 A detailed investigation completed in the war’s second half found the
total to be higher still. The Verschlepptenlisten, thick tomes containing deportees’
names, ages, and places of origin, registered 1,133 people from Königsberg52 Letter of Minister des Innern to Regierungspräsidenten, November 18, 1914. AP
Olsztyn: OP Ostpreußen: 3/528, fols. 86–87.
53 Ibid. Also Gause, “Quellen zur Geschichte,” 86. The order was issued by the
Minister of Justice on November 4, 1914.
54 Auswärtiges Amt, Greueltaten russischer Truppen gegen deutsche Zivilpersonen
und deutsche Kriegsgefangene ðBerlin, 1915Þ. A copy is held in BA-MA Freiburg: RM5/
2514. Cf. Gause, “Quellen zur Geschichte,” 87.
55 See the tables for Königsberg and Allenstein Counties in “Besichtigung der durch
die Russeneinfällen beschädigten Teile der Provinz Ostpreußen durch die Minister
½Staatsministerium,” ca. April 1915. A report by the county president in Gumbinnen in
the same ﬁle estimated that 418 civilians had lost their lives there. However, further
inquiries had raised this ﬁgure to 451 by the summer, and it is this ﬁgure that is used to
calculate the above total. See GStA, Berlin: I. HARep. 90A, 1064, and, for the Gumbinnen
table ðand accompanying letter dated June 4, 1915Þ with updated ﬁgures, AP Olsztyn: OP
Ostpreußen: 3/529, fols. 72–74.
56 Memo from Oberpräsident to all East Prussian Landräte, September 12, 1915. AP
Olsztyn: LA Braunsberg: 10/157.
57 See the tables for Königsberg and Allenstein Counties of April and the Gumbinnen
table of June 4, 1915, in, respectively, GStA, Berlin: I. HARep. 90A, 1064 and APOlsztyn:
OP Ostpreußen: 3/529, fol. 74.
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County, 3,327 from Allenstein County, and 8,545 from Gumbinnen County: in
all, 13,005 deportees.58
794 WatsonThe deportation of civilians was only debatably a war crime, as such action had
not been foreseen or forbidden by the 1907 Hague Convention. The German
administration appears to have accepted that ﬁt men liable for military service
could legitimately be arrested and removed in order to stop them from joining
their country’s army upon liberation.59 Additionally, occupiers were obliged by
the Hague Convention to “ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety,” and
it could be argued that this goal was facilitated by the removal of potentially
rebellious elements from the territory.60 Many of the deported seem highly un-
likely to have fallen into this category, however: almost half of those taken were
women and children.61 Infants of six weeks and people of over eighty years were
among the deportees.62 The conditions in which they were removed certainly
contravened the convention’s demand that occupiers should respect “the lives of
persons, and private property.” Superintendent Skierlo, a seventy-four-year-old
clergyman from the town of Johannisburg who was deported in February 1915,
recorded the inefﬁciency and corruption that he encountered during his almost
three-week journey to Simbirsk on the Volga. The Russian authorities had
prepared little in advance, and much of the prisoners’ time was spent in anxious
waiting. When a cattle wagon was eventually supplied for an eight-day rail trip, it
contained only hard wooden boards on which to sleep and no toilet or bucket for
58 The lists of the deported for the Königsberg, Allenstein, and Gumbinnen Counties
from ca. 1916–17 are held in GStA, Berlin: XX. HA Rep. 2II, 3578, 3579, and 3580,
respectively. The ﬁgure for Gumbinnen includes entries from supplementary lists in ibid.,
3578 and 3580, fols. 12–15.
59 See Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 236–37. It is notable that a compilation report
drafted by the Oberpräsident from the county commissions’ ﬁndings excluded references
to the deportation of military-aged men. See “Bericht über russische Grausamkeiten” and
covering letter fromOberpräsident to Rittmeister Graf Lehndorff of Armee-Oberkommando
8, February 28, 1915. AP Olsztyn: OP Ostpreußen: 3/528, fols. 277–96.
60 Article 43 of the Annex to “Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War
in Land. 2d Peace Conference, The Hague, 18 Oct. 1907. IV,” in Conventions and
Declarations.
61 Gause stated that 4,000 women and more than 2,500 children were deported. Gause,
Russen in Ostpreußen, 243. Among the 10,685 people recorded by the District Adminis-
trators as deported, 2,578 were women and 2,710 children. Calculated from tables for
Königsberg and Allenstein Counties of April and the Gumbinnen table of June 4, 1915, in,
respectively, GStA, Berlin: I. HARep. 90A, 1064, and APOlsztyn: OPOstpreußen: 3/529,
fol. 74.
62 See report by Regierungspräsident Gumbinnen to Unterstaatssekretär Heinrichs,
April 21, 1915. GStA, Berlin: I. HA Rep. 90A, 1064, pp. 7–8 of report. For a few of
many examples, see the entries for two-year-old Marta M., ﬁve-year-old Friedrich K., and
eighty-six-year-old Karl J. in the Königsberg “Verschlepptenliste.”GStA, Berlin: XX. HA
Rep. 2II, 3578, fols. 33, 24, and 22.
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washing. Food was scant and money intended for the prisoners was stolen by
their guards. Two old men and a child died en route. The worst of the experience
Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia 795ended once the deportees began their internment in Simbirsk, but life remained
hard. Skierlo was only one of over 4,000 East Prussians, nearly one-third of those
deported, who never saw Germany again and died in captivity.63
The broad accuracy of the statistics for civilian fatalities and deportations
collected by the East Prussian authorities is conﬁrmed by Dr. Fritz Gause’s study
of the invasions, which he undertook in the conﬂict’s aftermath ðtable 1Þ. He put
the number of people deported to Russia slightly higher, at 13,566 East Prussians,
basing this estimate mainly on ofﬁcial ﬁgures that were later published in the
press.64 His major achievement, however, was to reﬁne the wartime data on those
killed, using material, now lost, that had been collected by the Provinzialkommis-
sion für ostpreußische Kriegsgeschichte ðProvincial commission for East Prus-
sian war historyÞ. This organization had been established in September 1915 at
the behest of the senior president of East Prussia. Led by Professor Albert Brack-
mann, its task was to preserve the memory of the invasions and gather informa-
tion to facilitate writing their history. At its request, over the winter of 1915–16,
thousands of teachers across East Prussia interviewed locals and wrote chronicles
of their communities’ experiences during the invasions, organized according to a
schema laid down by the commission. These chronicles were subjected to rigor-
ous checks and were added to by both parish and district committees before
being deposited with the Provincial Commission.65 Gause used the results of this
enormous civic effort to correct ofﬁcial estimates for civilian fatalities. Signiﬁ-
cantly, by eliminating double counting and accidental deaths in the ﬁghting, he
revised the ofﬁcialﬁgures downward—a good indication of his scholarly integrity.
His painstaking research concluded that 1,491 East Prussians had been killed de-
liberately by the Russians.66
63 See the diary extracts in Anna Skierlo, “Meines Mannes und meine Erlebnisse in64 Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 246 and 359, endnote 37. Gause not only used the
press reports but also consulted the provincial documentation from which the ﬁgures
originated.
65 Gause, “Quellen zur Geschichte des Russeneinfalls,” 90–96. Most of these chroni-
cles are lost, along with the other papers of the Provinzialkommission für Ostpreußische
Kriegsgeschichte. Only a small remnant from the districts of Johannisburg and Insterburg
survives in GStA, Berlin under the catalog reference XX. HA, Rep. 235.
66 Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 229. For details on Gause’s sources, see 351–52,
endnote 371. Also Gause, “Quellen zur Geschichte des Russeneinfalls,” 105. The ofﬁcial
Russischer ½sicGefangenschaft vom 14. Februar 1915 bis 10. Mai 1918.”APOlsztyn: RP
Allenstein: 180, fols. 453–75. For other experiences of deportation and internment, and
the fatality ﬁgures, see Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 236–82, and also Serena Tiepolato,
“‘ . . . und nun waren wir auch Verbannte: Warum? Weshalb?’ Deportate prussiane in
Russia 1914–1918,” DEP—Deportate, esuli, profughe: Rivista telematica di studi sulla
memoria femminile 1 ð2004Þ: 59–85.
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While killings and deportations could be calculated with reasonable accuracy,
the incidence of a third type of atrocity, sexual assault, was more difﬁcult to
Table 1
Civilian Casualties in East Prussia, 1914–15
Spring/Summer 1915 Investigations Gause’s Postwar Investigation
Allenstein Gumbinnen Königsberg Allenstein Gumbinnen Königsberg
Killed 851 451 313 587 572 332
Deported 3,040 6,449 1,196 3,410 9,044 1,112
Raped 98 1841 56 . . . . . . . . .
SOURCES.—Spring/Summer 1915 investigations: tables for the Königsberg and Allenstein regions and for ﬁve
districts in Gumbinnen, compiled ca. April 1915, in Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin:
I. HA Rep. 90A, 1064, and table for the Gumbinnen region, June 1915, in Archiwum Państwowe w Olsztynie:
Oberpräsidium von Ostpreussen ðNaczelne Prezydium Prus WschodnichÞ: 3/529, fol. 74. Postwar investigation:
Fritz Gause, Die Russen in Ostpreußen 1914/15: Im Auftrage des Landeshauptmanns der Provinz Ostpreußen
ðKönigsberg, 1931Þ, 229 and 246.
796 Watsonestablish due to victims’ reluctance to report the crime.67 The Foreign Ofﬁce’s
“White Book” accused Russian troops of committing “countless . . . bestial
rapes,” stating that victims included heavily pregnant women, the aged, and a
minor.68 This claim may not have been purely cynical propaganda; an internal
report by the president of Gumbinnen County from February 1915 asserted that
rapes had been frequent and “in part . . . quite systematically prepared” during the
second invasion.69 While it soon became apparent that this was an exaggeration,
the ﬁgure of ninety-eight sexual assaults that was ultimately accepted by provin-
cial authorities is clearly far too low. Based on responses to a questionnaire cir-
ﬁgures that he corrected were taken from a volume, now destroyed, entitled “Listen der67 For reluctance to report rapes, see the statements by Pfarrer Krix and Freiherr von
Mirbach inAllensteinCounty report,October 29, 1914.APOlsztyn:OPOstpreußen: 3/528,
fols. 46 and 57. Gause provided no estimate for rapes, stating only that the number was
not “excessively large” given the size of Russian forces in East Prussia. Reﬂecting con-
temporary racist prejudices, he nonetheless argued that Russians were more inclined than
men of western nations to commit the crime. See Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 224.
68 Auswärtiges Amt,Greueltaten russischer Truppen, introduction and annexes 42–54.
69 Report by Regierungspräsident Gumbinnen to Oberpräsident, February 21, 1915.
GStA, Berlin: XX. HA Rep. 2II, 3559, reverse of fol. 98. The claim of systematic sexual
assault was later dropped by the president, although he still stated that “the number of
rapes . . . go into the hundreds.” See his report to Unterstaatssekretär Heinrichs, April 21,
1915. GStA, Berlin: I. HA Rep. 90A, 1064, p. 8 of report.
getöteten Ostpreußen” kept in the papers of the stellvertretendes Generalkommando des I.
Armeekorps. As the information in this volume had been originally supplied by the
Landräte of East Prussia, it was probably similar or identical to the statistics given to the
ministerial delegation in April 1915 cited in this article.
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culated among evangelical clergymen, it made no allowance for unreported
incidents, omitted the province’s Catholic minority, and ignored the returns of
Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia 797ministers who had given no number but had stated that many sexual assaults had
been committed.70 The ﬁgure also does not tally with what is known about
pregnancies resulting from rape by tsarist troops. Thirty-seven so-called Russian
children were receiving state support by May 1917, and the authorities knew of
another eleven who had either been stillborn or had since died.71 It is highly
improbable that almost half of all rapes led to pregnancies.72More credible, there-
fore, are the estimates supplied by the district administrators, which together sug-
gest that a minimum of 338 sexual assaults were perpetrated by Russian soldiers
during the invasions.73
The provincial authorities’ investigations left no doubt that East Prussians had
suffered during the Russian invasions. Their detailed inquiries produced copious
evidence of murder, rape, and mass deportations. Some ofﬁcials, deeply shocked
by the violence, reached for historical analogies to contextualize it; the tsar’s
soldiers were accused of behaving “exactly in the manner usual in the Thirty
Years’ War” and likened to “the Tatars who, for the last time 250 years ago,
devastated this province.”74 This was hyperbole. More important are the ques-
tions of why these Russian atrocities took place, and how far they resembled
those perpetrated contemporaneously by the German army in Belgium and
northern France.
70 “Besprechung über die zurVersorgungder sogenannten ‘Russenkinder’ zu treffenden
Massnahmen,” July 27, 1915. AP Olsztyn: OP Ostpreußen: 3/529, fols. 137 and 140–44.
Catholics comprised 14 percent of East Prussia’s population.
71 See report on “Fürsorge für die Russenkinder,” accompanied by letter from
Oberpräsident toMinister des Innern, November 24, 1916, and also letter of Oberpräsident
to Regierungshauptkasse inKönigsberg, May 5, 1917. APOlsztyn: OPOstpreußen: 3/530,
fols. 290–93, 391–94, and 399.
72 Research on the mass rapes perpetrated by Soviet soldiers in Berlin in 1945 suggests
that between 13 and 25 percent of rapes resulted in pregnancies. Even these percentages
may be too high, however, as pregnant women were presumably especially likely to seek
medical treatment and therefore to be recorded. See Barbara Johr, “Die Ereignisse in
Zahlen,” in Helke Sander and Barbara Johr, Befreier und Befreite: Krieg, Vergewaltigung,
Kinder ðFrankfurt am Main, 2005Þ, 48–54.
73 This total has been calculated by adding statistics for rape in Allenstein ð98Þ,
Königsberg ð56Þ, andﬁve ðof the fourteenÞ districts ðLand- and StadtkreiseÞ of Gumbinnen
ð184Þ counties in tables compiled for the ministers’ visit to East Prussia in April 1915. See
“Besichtigung der durch die Russeneinfällen beschädigten Teile der Provinz Ostpreußen
durch die Minister ½Staatsministerium.”GStA, Berlin: I. HA Rep. 90A, 1064.
74 Report by Regierungspräsident Gumbinnen to Unterstaatssekretär Heinrichs,
April 21, 1915. GStA, Berlin: I. HA Rep. 90A, 1064, pp. 8–9 of report. In 1656, the Tatars
had slaughtered 11,000 East Prussians and taken 34,000 into slavery. See Richard Blanke,
Polish-Speaking Germans? Language and National Identity among the Masurians since
1871 ðCologne, 2001Þ, 35–36.
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III
798 WatsonThe Russian army of 1914 was in structure, ethos, and political importance not so
different from its German opponent. Like the Wilhelmine and, indeed, the
Habsburg armies, it occupied a privileged position in the imperial state, isolated
from civilian control and owing direct fealty to the monarch. The armies’ basic
assumptions and standard operating procedures were also not dissimilar. Despite
the need to function across an empire stretching over two continents, the tsarist
force, as planning for the East Prussian campaign revealed, suffered from some-
thing of the same disregard for logistical realities, myopic faith in the decisiveness
of willpower in combat, and inability to match operational ambitions to available
resources as did its German opponent.75 Nor, as its long history of colonial
campaigning on the Black Sea and in Asia prove, did the tsar’s army have any-
thing to learn from its western neighbor about instrumentalizing civilians. Its
leaders shared their German counterparts’ deep reluctance to accept civilian re-
sistance as legitimate—an attitude that the army’s suppression of the Russian rev-
olution of 1905 can only have reinforced.76 There were, of course, important
differences as well. The Russian ofﬁcer corps lacked the cohesion and doctrinal
unity of its Prussian counterpart, and unit discipline was more varied, leading to
weak “linkages” that impeded the force’s operational command and coordina-
tion.77 It also had no traumatic institutional memory of battle with francs-tireurs,
despite considerable experience of irregular warfare. Nonetheless, tsarist ofﬁcers
possessed their own bugbears and bogeymen, stemming in large part from a
fateful preoccupation with ethnicity, especially after 1905. Their training, which
placed much emphasis on military geography and statistics, had institutionalized
an understanding of populations as composed of different ethnic “elements,” each
of which possessed its own speciﬁc qualities. Ethnicity became equated with
reliability.78 The consequent expectations greatly affected Russian soldiers’ and
ofﬁcers’ propensity to perpetrate atrocities when they went to war in 1914.
Recent research has recognized the imperial Russian army’s potential for
radical violence against civilians, identifying deportation as its most distinctive
feature. The force’s experience of this type of operation went as far back as the
75 Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the
Disasters of 1914 ðIthaca, NY, 1984Þ, 160–64, and 189–98. For the German army’s similar
traits, see Hull, Absolute Destruction, 2–3.
76 Best, Humanity in Warfare, 180–85, 187, and 192.
77 See BruceW.Menning, Bayonets before Bullets: The Imperial Russian Army, 1861–
1914 ðBloomington, IN, 1992Þ, esp. 3, 100–103, 215–17, 236–37, 270, and 277.
78 Peter Holquist, “To Count, to Extract, and to Exterminate: Population Statistics and
Population Politics in Late Imperial and Soviet Russia,” in A State of Nations: Empire and
Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin
ðOxford, 2001Þ, 112–16. Also, Joshua A. Sanborn, Drafting the Russian Nation: Military
Conscription, Total War, and Mass Politics, 1905–1925 ðDeKalb, IL, 2003Þ, 65–82.
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1860s, when it had bloodily expelled from the Caucasus hundreds of thousands of
people belonging to ethnicities that were considered hostile.79 At the opening of
Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia 799the First World War, new “Regulations for Field Administration of the Army in
Wartime” granted it almost unlimited powers over civil populations in the war
zone, including the authority to deport individuals or groups.80 It used this right
extensively: although Isabel Hull has pointed to the German army’s deportations
of at least 23,000 Belgian and French civilians in the ﬁrst weeks of hostilities as
evidence of its exceptional control mania, calling the practice “a more perfect way
to achieve order,” these actions were dwarfed by those of the Russian force.
Around 300,000 enemy expatriates and ðeven before the “Great Retreat” of 1915Þ
hundreds of thousands of Russian-subject Germans and Jews were uprooted
within the tsarist empire. On the Caucasian front, 10,000 Russian-subject Mus-
lims were forcibly removed at the start of that year. Deportations were also an
important part of the Russian strategy in occupied Galicia, where 50,000 Habs-
burg Jews were moved around the crownland and another 20,000 to 30,000
compelled to leave for Russia in the ﬁrst half of 1915.81
In East Prussia too, deportation was a deﬁning characteristic of Russian
invasion and occupation: its victims numbered nine times those killed in the
invasions. Analysis reveals that the practice did not remain static. Only aggregate
ﬁgures survive, but comparison of data from districts overrun once and those
overrun twice testiﬁes to a process of radicalization. In the ﬁrst invasion, victims
of deportation were overwhelmingly men: all but ten of the 724 inhabitants
deported from the eleven districts of Königsberg County that were lost to the
Russians in August and September 1914 were adult males. Similarly, 593 of
608 people removed from the six districts of Allenstein County invaded only in
the same months were men.82 Many were of military age and were taken to stop
79 See Holquist, “To Count, to Extract, and to Exterminate,” 116–19, and Stephen D.
Shenﬁeld, “The Circassians: A Forgotten Genocide?” in The Massacre in History, ed.
Mark Levene and Penny Roberts ðNew York and Oxford, 1999Þ, 149–62.
80 See Prusin, Nationalizing a Borderland, 19, and Lohr, “Russian Army and the
Jews,” 407.
81 The deportations of enemy subjects as well as Russian-subject Germans and Jews
within the tsarist empire in 1914–15 is examined in Eric Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian
Empire: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during World War I ðCambridge, MA,
2003Þ, 121–65. For the Caucasus and Galicia, see, respectively, Michael A. Reynolds,
Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires 1908–
1918 ðCambridge, 2011Þ, 144, and Prusin, Nationalizing a Borderland, 62. For the
German military’s deportations, see Hull, Absolute Destruction, 211–12.
82 See tables for Königsberg and Allenstein Counties, ca. April 1915, in GStA, Berlin:
I. HA Rep. 90A, 1064. The Königsberg districts invaded only in August and September
1914 were Labiau, Wehlau, Gerdauen, Rastenburg, Friedland, Königsberg ðLandÞ, Pr.-
Eylau, Heilsberg, Braunsberg, and, marginally, Heiligenbeil and Mohrungen. Königsberg
Stadt, Fischhausen, and Pr. Holland were never invaded and Memel was attacked only in
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them from joining the German army. Others had been accused of spying, sab-
otage, or resistance, and some unfortunates were impressed with their wagons
800 Watsoninto enemy supply columns and then forced to retreat with the Russians.83 Districts
that were reinvaded after the autumn of 1914, by contrast, lost large numbers
of women and children. In Lyck, Johannisburg, and Lötzen, the three districts
of Allenstein County that had been invaded in the summer and then partially
or entirely reoccupied from November 1914 until February 1915, 372 women
and 716 children were taken, almost one-third of the 3,535 deportees. Among
the 472 people herded back to Russia during the Memel raid in March 1915, a
majority ð289Þ were women and children.84 The president of Gumbinnen County
conﬁrmed the unprecedentedly extensive, although haphazard, nature of depor-
tations in the second invasion. He estimated that over 30 percent of people who
had not evacuated the occupied areas had been removed. In the north of the
county, whole communities had disappeared.85
The expansion of deportations from encompassing predominantly adult males
to, in some cases, including whole communities was made possible by the static
warfare of the second invasion. This enabled the Russians to develop sophisti-
cated logistical networks, facilitating the transportation of large numbers of
people. It also allowed the captured territory to be comprehensively looted and
the stolen goods moved: the plundering in the winter of 1914–15 was far more
systematic, militarily organized, and thorough than that of the summer.86 More
important, however, the radicalization of deportation practices in East Prussia
during the autumn and winter of 1914 was part of a wider set of policy shifts
within the tsarist empire. In this period, the internment of enemy subjects in
Russia’s military-governed western provinces, which had begun with healthy
military-aged males but quickly encompassed women and children as well,
March 1915. The six districts in Allenstein County invaded only once were Sensburg,
Rössel, Ortelsburg, Allenstein, Neidenburg, and Osterrode. The ﬁgures underestimate the
total deported ðsee table 1Þ, but there is no reason to doubt that the gender breakdown they
provide is broadly accurate.
83 Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 101 and 236–37. For men taken with carts, see also
the reports by Fußgendarmerie-Wachtmeister Stombrowski and Stoysnat½?, both Septem-
ber 21, 1914. AP Olsztyn: RPAllenstein: 179, fols. 173–76 and 193.
84 Tables for Allenstein and Königsberg Counties, ca. April 1915, in GStA, Berlin: I.
HA Rep. 90A, 1064.
85 Report by Regierungspräsident Gumbinnen to Unterstaatssekretär Heinrichs,
April 21, 1915. GStA, Berlin: I. HA Rep. 90A, 1064, pp. 7–8 of report. Cf. Gause, Russen
in Ostpreußen, 242–43.
86 Report by Oberpräsident to Minister des Innern, March 20, 1915. AP Olsztyn: OP
Ostpreußen: 3/528, fols. 362–63. Also, report by Regierungspräsident Gumbinnen to
Unterstaatssekretär Heinrichs, April 21, 1915, in GStA, Berlin: I. HA Rep. 90A, 1064,
. 9 of report. For corroboration from the Russian side, see the ðtranslatedÞ letter of a
ussian soldier in AP Olsztyn: RPAllenstein: 180, fol. 134.p
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drastically expanded. An even more extraordinary step was taken in the last
months of 1914, when ethnic German subjects of the tsar were also expelled
Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia 801from these territories. Signiﬁcantly, the same commanders were involved in both
internal deportations and those in occupied areas. In November, the month that
his army invaded East Prussia, General Sievers ordered the expulsion of all
enemy subjects from the Riga District and Kurland Province of Russia. Whether
similar plans were formulated for East Prussia is unknown; a surviving order from
Sievers suggests that he initially intended to sweep German men toward enemy
lines, not collect them and their families for transportation to Russia.87 If an order
for extensive deportations was later issued, it was implemented inconsistently; as
on other fronts, confusion, indecision, and local considerations may have affected
the timing and thoroughness with which the populations of different areas were
removed. Nonetheless, the trend in East Prussia, as elsewhere in the winter of
1914–15, was clearly toward more total deportation, driven by the tsarist army’s
chief of staff, General N. N. Ianushkevich, and its commander in chief, Grand
Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich.88
The Russian military did not limit itself to moving people by force. It also
deliberately killed civilians, particularly during the war’s opening campaigns.
Historians have not yet fully unraveled the dynamics behind this violence, which
was highly diverse, encompassing at different times and places military execu-
tions and massacres, semiauthorized pogroms, and panic-induced bloodshed, as
well as actions by individuals or ill-disciplined small groups. Crucially, it was
shaped, like the German atrocities in the west, fundamentally by the preconcep-
tions with which the army entered the war. As Peter Holquist has pointed out,
military-statistical studies had already been prepared in peacetime by the tsarist
army to predict how peoples living in territories over which it might ﬁght would
behave. These assessments proved highly important in determining the severity
with which Russian invaders treated these different ethnicities in 1914.89
A comparative glance at the tsarist army’s conduct towardUkrainians and Jews
in Habsburg Galicia illustrates this point. In Galicia, Ukrainians were perceived
by the army as “Russian peasants,” and prewar military assessments expected
87 See the captured Russian order reproduced in Auswärtiges Amt, Greueltaten
russischer Truppen, annex 81. This indicates that Sievers had been commanded by the
chief of staff of the Northwestern Front Armies on November 21, 1914 ðRussian calendarÞ
to push all healthymale enemy subjects of ten years old and older toward German lines. Cf.
also Sievers’s announcement warning East Prussian men of working age to leave or be
taken prisoner, published in Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 83–84.
88 See Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire, 122–37, and Prusin, Nationalizing a
Borderland, 48–54.
89 This argument develops Peter Holquist’s work on the tsarist military’s ethnic stereo-
typing and violence against the Jews of Galicia. See especially Peter Holquist, “Les
violences de l’armée russe à l’encontre des Juifs en 1915: Causes et limites,” in Vers la
guerre totale: Le tournant de 1914–15, ed. John Horne ðParis, 2010Þ, 191–219.
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them to welcome tsarist troops as liberators. In reality, these peasants were
separated by both language and Uniate faith from the Russians, inconvenient
802 Watsonfacts that prompted tsarist authorities to launch an intrusive and counterproduc-
tive campaign of cultural assimilation against them during the occupation—yet
they were generally not targets of military violence during the 1914–15 invasion.
Austrian ofﬁcials considered them to have been “well treated.”90
The Jews of Galicia were, by contrast, victimized. The tsar’s army was ﬁercely
antisemitic. It held Jews to be materialistic, selﬁsh, and cowardly; they were
thought too unmartial to pose a physical threat, but prewar studies did predict that
they could “serve both sides, both by supplying goods but also by spying.”91
These stereotypes, which at ﬁrst encouraged contempt rather than fear, shaped
Russian brutality toward Jewish communities in the opening weeks of the in-
vasion. Pogroms, often carried out by unruly and virulently antisemitic Cossack
units, were its main manifestation. Unlike German atrocities, this wild and
unstructured violence had no military function, although claims that Jewish girls
had shot at Russian troops were sometimes used to excuse it.92 It was motivated
instead by a desire to humiliate, rape, and plunder. Reports compiled by a Jewish
welfare activist who toured eastern Galicia in 1916, Dr. Bernard Hausner, and by
local Habsburg ofﬁcials and gendarmes record numerous beatings and sexual
assaults, as well as massive theft and material destruction. Some victims did die,
but killing was not the perpetrators’ principal aim, and this early violence con-
sequently appears to have been less lethal than the reprisals and punishments
meted out by military command in places where—as in Belgium, France, and, as
will be explained, East Prussia—populations were considered to be active threats.
Mounting spy hysteria soon kindled fears that Jews were damaging the army,
however, and this, along with Ianushkevich’s fanatical antisemitism, increased
the troops’ viciousness and prompted the introduction of radical ofﬁcial counter-
measures. The mass deportations that began in 1915, intended both as security
precautions and as preemptive reprisals, were carried out with great callousness.
These deportations and the Russians’ ﬁnal brutal retreat probably cost more
human lives than the pogroms of the war’s ﬁrst weeks.93
90 “Bericht des Legationsrates Baron Andrian über seine Informationsreise nach
Ostgalizien,” July 26, 1915, p. 17 of report. Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv Vienna: MdI,
Präsidiale ð1914–15Þ 22/Galiz. ðKarton 2116Þ: Akte 19644. See also Mark von Hagen,
War in a European Borderland: Occupations and Occupation Plans in Galicia and
Ukraine, 1914–1918 ðSeattle, 2007Þ, 32–42.
91 Quoted in Holquist, “Role of Personality,” 57. See also Sanborn, Drafting the
Russian Nation, 116.
92 S. Ansky, The Enemy at His Pleasure: A Journey through the Jewish Pale of
Settlement during World War I, ed. and trans. Joachim Neugroschel ðNew York, 2002Þ,
68–70 and 78.
93 See the microﬁlmed reports of the Jewish aid worker Dr. Bernard Hausner and the
supplementary information gathered by district ofﬁcials and gendarmerie in the Central
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The killings perpetrated by the Russian army in East Prussia had much more in
common, both quantitatively and qualitatively, with German atrocities in the west
Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia 803than with the comparatively mild treatment of Ukrainians or the initial “wild”
violence meted out to Galician Jews. Analysis of available fatality statistics
reveals that the extent of the bloodshed was remarkably similar in the two
campaigns. The absolute numbers of victims of military violence were, of course,
far lower in East Prussia than in Belgium and northern France: 1,491 as against
6,427 deaths. Signiﬁcantly, however, if fatalities are placed in proportion to the
peacetime populations of the areas overrun, it becomes clear that the intensity of
the violence was closely comparable. A little over 1.7 million people lived in the
districts of East Prussia captured by Russian troops, of whom 0.086 percent was
killed.94 The regions of Belgium and France taken by the German army up to
mid-September 1914 were inhabited by 8.3 million people, 0.078 percent of
whom were killed.95 In Belgian areas alone the fatality rate was greater, reaching
Archives for the History of the Jewish People, Jerusalem: HM2–9177 ðoriginals held in94 The peacetime population of areas that came into contact with Russian troops be-
tween August 1914 and March 1915 has been calculated at 1,727,967: namely, the pop-
ulation of East Prussia apart from the districts of Fischhausen and Preußisch Holland and
the city of Königsberg. For population ﬁgures, see Hesse and Goeldel, Bevölkerung von
Ostpreußen, 2, 6, and 12. For the ﬁrst invasion alone, the proportion of killed among the
population lay in a range between 0.071 and 0.085 percent, but the most likely ﬁgure is
0.081 percent. These calculations have been made on the basis of an invaded population of
1,666,175 ðsame districts as above, but excluding MemelÞ, a minimum ﬁgure for killings
of 1,187 people ðcomprising Königsberg’s casualties without Memel added to four-ﬁfths
of those of Allenstein and GumbinnenÞ, a maximum ﬁgure of 1,418 ðcomprising Königs-
berg’s casualties without Memel added to all of those of Allenstein and GumbinnenÞ, and
a best-estimate ﬁgure of 1,342 ðcomprising all casualties apart from the seventy killed at
Memel and a further seventy-nine whom Gause ½Russen in Ostpreußen, 159–60, 184–85,
and 219 stated were killed during the second invasionÞ.
95 This estimate for the population of the territories invaded in August and early
September 1914 is derived from ﬁgures in Ministère de l’Intérieur, Annuaire statistique
de la Belgique et du Congo belge: Quarante deuxième année—1911; Tome XLII ðBrussels,
1912Þ, 4, and Statistique Générale de la France, Résultats statistiques du recensement
général de la population, effectué le 5Mars 1911, 5 vols. ðParis, 1913Þ, 1:48–59, andmaps
Tsentral’nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukrainy, L’viv: fond 146 opis 4Þ. I am grateful
to Dr. Tim Buchen for alerting me to the existence of these valuable sources. They indicate
that fatalities were less heavy at Russian troops’ entry into Galicia, despite the frequent
pogroms, than later on in the invasion. Still, it should be noted that the early “wild violence”
did include some extremely bloody incidents. In Nadwórna, seven women died after being
raped in early September 1914. Among the other twenty-two inhabitants killed during the
shtetl’s ten-month occupation, some may also have been slaughtered at this time. The
notorious Lwów pogrom of September 27, 1914, caused up to forty-seven fatalities. See
ibid., fols. 14 and 59, and, for Lwów, Christoph Mick, Kriegserfahrungen in einer multi-
ethnischen Stadt: Lemberg 1914–1947 ðWiesbaden, 2010Þ, 105–6. Also, more generally,
Prusin, Nationalizing a Borderland, 26–32 and 48–59, and Holquist, “Role of Personal-
ity,” 61–67.
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0.13 percent of the peacetime population.96 This was attributable less to any
uniquely German propensity for brutality, however, than to the comparative
804 Watsonabundance of military-aged males among the Belgian civilian populace at the
war’s opening. In both east and west, males aged between nineteen and forty-ﬁve
years old were most likely to be the victims of invading armies’ suspicion and
aggression. As Belgium, unlike Germany, operated no system of universal con-
scription, the size of its target population was far larger than that of East Prussia.97
The importance of this factor is highlighted by the abrupt drop in killings after the
kaiser’s army crossed into France, where the draft was evenmore thorough than in
Germany.Although the peacetime population therewas double that of the districts
of East Prussia that were invaded, “only” 906 civilianswere killed—far fewer than
the number of East Prussians who died at Russian hands.98
The timing of tsarist military killings also corresponds with that of the German
violence in Belgium and France. The overwhelming majority of civilian deaths in
East Prussia happened in the ﬁrst invasion, in August and September 1914. In
Königsberg County, all but the seventy-three civilian fatalities of the Memel raid
took place in these months. In Allenstein County, at least four-ﬁfths, and probably
almost all, civilian deaths date from the same period. Estimating casualties in
Gumbinnen County is more difﬁcult, but widespread reports of violence and the
experience of the other two counties make it highly likely that there too the
majority of killings took place in the ﬁrst invasion. The predominance of fatali-
ties in this ﬁrst invasion is not solely attributable to the greater extent of the
Russians’ advance. The tsarist army was, in this earlier campaign, more ready
than it was later to kill civilians. In Lyck, for example, which was overrun in both
attacks, 127 of the district’s inhabitants were killed in August or September 1914,
while only seven died at Russian hands during the occupation in the autumn and
winter of 1914–15.99
in Horne and Kramer, German Atrocities, 10 and 182. For Belgium, it comprises the
prewar populations of the ﬁve provinces most directly affected by the German invasion:
Brabant, Hainault, Liége, Luxembourg, and Namur. Belgian total: 4,184,946. For France,
it consists of the prewar population of the départements of the Aisne and Ardennes, the
Marne département except for the arrondissement of Vitry-le-François, and the following
arrondissements ðwith the relevant département in parenthesesÞ: Lille, Avesnes, Cambrai,
Douai, Valenciennes ðNordÞ, Arras ðPas de CalaisÞ, Amiens, Doullens, Montdidier,
Péronne ðSommeÞ, Clermont, Compiègne, Senlis ðOiseÞ, Meux ðSeine-et-MarneÞ,
Montmédy ðMeuseÞ, and Briey ðMerthe-et-MoselleÞ. No ﬁgure for the small areas of the
Vosges or Seine-et-Oise that were invaded has been estimated. French total: 4,072,638.
96 Belgium suffered 5,521 fatalities in the 1914 invasion. See Horne and Kramer,
German Atrocities, 74. The death rate has been calculated as in n. 95 using population
statistics in Ministère de l’Intérieur, Annuaire statistique—1911; Tome XLII, 4.
97 Horne and Kramer, German Atrocities, 69 and 95.
98 Ibid., 74.
99 As in the case of deportations, calculating fatality rates for each invasion is difﬁcult
because the most reliable statistics refer only to the whole period between August 1914 and
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The Russians’ violence in East Prussia was motivated, like that of the kaiser’s
military in Belgium and France, primarily by fears of facing a “people’s war.” The
Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia 805peacetime military-statistical studies had primed tsarist commanders to regard the
province’s populace as far more dangerous than that of Galicia, for ethnic Ger-
mans, unlike Jews or Ukrainians, were predicted to be hostile. Consequently, in
contrast to the “wild” violence dominating the ﬁrst weeks of the campaign in the
Habsburg lands, which at least some senior Russian commanders tried to rein in,
much of the bloodshed in East Prussia was from the outset militarily purposeful,
intended to punish and deter civilian resistance.100 Already onAugust 18, General
Rennenkampf issued a proclamationwarning that oppositionwould be “ruthlessly
punished, regardless of gender or age.” Places where “even the smallest attack
on the Russian army is perpetrated” were to be “immediately burned to the
ground.”101 Less senior ofﬁcers repeated these threats, exacted war levies, de-
manded hostages, and took other precautions to avoid ambush; in one village, the
inhabitants were made to stand with raised hands while troops marched past.102
Lower ranks were similarly nervous and feared being poisoned by civilians.103
March 1915. Only Königsberg County is relatively uncomplicated, as—with the exception
of Memel District, which escaped attack until March 1915—it was overrun only during the100 For an attempt to end troops’ initial “wild” violence in Galicia, see the order of
Twenty-Fourth Corps Commander, August 13, 1914 ðRussian calendarÞ, discussed in
Sanborn, Drafting the Russian Nation, 171–72.
101 “BekanntmachungallenEinwohnerenOst.Preussens ½sic,” signedbyRennenkampf,
August 18, 1914, in Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Wiesbaden ðhereafter HHStA
WiesbadenÞ: Plakate und Kriegsdocumente, no. 3012/3472.
102 For ofﬁcers’ threats, see, for example, Pfarrer Penschuck’s account of the ﬁrst
invasion, January 5, 1915. AP Olsztyn: OP Ostpreußen: 3/528, fol. 237. For the villagers,
see report by Oberwachtmeister Freiburg, September 21, 1914. APOlsztyn: RPAllenstein:
179, fol. 245.
103 See, for example, Oberförster Pietsch—Grünﬂiess, “Bericht über die während der
russischen Besetzung von Grünﬂiess in der Zeit vom 23.–29. August d.Js. gehabten
Erlebnisse bezw. Eindrücke.” GStA, Berlin: XX. HA Rep. 2II, 3560, fol. 28. Also Gause,
Russen in Ostpreußen, 34.
ﬁrst invasion. For the two other counties, Allenstein and Gumbinnen, detailed fatality
statistics from Allenstein probably give the best indication of how the violence was dis-
tributed. According to Gause, 587 civilians were killed in the county’s nine rural districts
ðLandkreiseÞ. Of these killings, 358 took place in the six districts invaded once in August
and September 1914. For Lyck, which was invaded twice, detailed gendarmerie records
indicate that 127 of the district’s 134 fatalities took place in the ﬁrst invasion. Therefore, at
least 485 of Allenstein County’s total 587 killings ð83 percentÞ happened in the ﬁrst
invasion. In Johannisburg and Lötzen, the other two districts in the county that faced two
invasions, it is highly likely that their seventy-four and twenty-one fatalities also mainly
happened during the ﬁrst assault. Landrat reports written after the two districts’ liberation
from the second invasion indicate that large numbers of killings had this time not been
reported. For ﬁgures, see Gause,Russen inOstpreußen, 229, and, for the Lyck gendarmerie
reports,APOlsztyn:RPAllenstein:179, fols. 169–256.ForLandrätereports for Johannisburg
ðFebruary 15, 1915Þ and Lötzen ðFebruary 18, 1915Þ, see AP Olsztyn: RPAllenstein: 177,
fols. 21–23 and 31–35.
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More gruesome rumors of inhabitants mutilating men, similar to those that spread
within the German army in the west, may also have circulated: an ofﬁcial Russian
806 Watsoncomplaint made after the invasion prompted East Prussian authorities to exhume
the bodies of six enemy ofﬁcers andmen buried in the district of Friedland in order
to disprove accusations that civilians had stabbed out their eyes and cut off their
ears.104
In East Prussia as in western Europe, the ﬂuid ﬁghting that characterized the
war’s early campaigns soon created circumstances appearing to conﬁrm military
expectations of civilian resistance. Tsarist troops frequently collided with small
enemy patrols camouﬂaged by ﬁeld grey uniforms and ﬁring smokeless muni-
tions from concealed positions. When such clashes took place in a village or
town, it was all too easy for Russian soldiers, suffering casualties but unable to
identify the source of shooting, to conclude that they were being attacked by the
inhabitants. In Gause’s estimation, such misapprehensions cost over 200 lives,
about one-seventh of all civilian fatalities in East Prussia.105 They helped to pro-
voke some of the worst massacres in the province. Around the town of Bischof-
stein on August 29, for example, thirty-six people were killed by the Russians
after a six-man German infantry patrol ﬁred on enemy troops attacking the
town’s railway station and then hurriedly dispersed. A gendarmerie inquiry
conducted in the aftermath argued that the Russians “must have suspected the
civilians of being either soldiers in disguise or treacherous.”106 The bloodiest
single incident of the invasion, the massacre of sixty-one people in the village of
Abschwangen on the same day, appears to have been a reprisal for the shooting
of a tsarist ofﬁcer by a German patrol, mistakenly attributed by the Russians to
enemy civilians.107 A similar misapprehension led to the bombardment of the
town of Neidenburg on August 22. Cossack cavalry entering Neidenburg were
ambushed by German cycle troops; the Cossacks’ corps commander, believing
his men to have been shot at by the citizens, ﬁred three hundred shells into the
town as a punishment.108 As in these cases, there was generally little evidence that
104 “Kriegsbericht” by Regierungspräsident Königsberg to Oberpräsident, June 9,
1915. GStA, Berlin: XX. HA Rep. 2II, 3558, fol. 84. For the similar rumors in the German
army, see Horne and Kramer, German Atrocities, 111–12.
105 Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 185. For the role of mobilization and battleﬁeld
factors in the German atrocities, see Horne and Kramer, German Atrocities, 113–29.
106 Report by Fußgend. Wachtmeister Sahm I, September 14, 1914. AP Olsztyn: RP
Allenstein: 179, fols. 19 and 106–7. Cf. Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 176–77.
107 See Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 183–84. Also, report by Regierungspräsident
Königsberg, September 11, 1914. GStA, Berlin: XX. HA Rep. 2II, 3558, fol. 12.
108 The bombardment was ordered by Lieutenant-General Martos, commander of the
Russian Fifteenth Corps. In a conversation with the British military attaché to Russia a few
days later, he explained that he had trained his artillery on Neidenburg because its citizens
had ﬁred on Cossack units. Civilians told the attaché, however, that a German patrol had
ﬁred at the Russians, and this was later conﬁrmed by the town’s mayor, who attested to the
presence of German bicycle troops. See, respectively, Alfred Knox,With the Russian Army
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civilians other than uniformed gendarmerie, foresters, and customs ofﬁcials had
resisted the enemy during the invasion. German investigations found only
Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia 807isolated instances of deﬁance—hardly surprising, as East Prussians had been
emphatically warned against taking such actions by their authorities.109 Nonethe-
less, the Russians clearly believed civilian opposition to be widespread. It was
considered sufﬁciently problematic to prompt the intervention of the army com-
mander in chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich: on September 2, he ordered
that any habitation whose populace ﬁred upon troops should suffer “complete
destruction.”110
The tsarist army’s imaginary “people’s war” was not identical to that of its
German opponent, however. The Russian force lacked the same traumatic mem-
ories of ﬁghting francs-tireurs, and the focus of its ofﬁcers’ obsessive fears was
therefore less the civilian guerrilla than the spy.111 The commander of the First
Cavalry Division, Vasily Gurko, remembered that “from the ﬁrst days of the
campaign it was clear to us that the Germans were employing every conceivable
method of obtaining information.” He believed that inhabitants were passing
intelligence to their own side, that youths on bicycles were performing recon-
naissance missions, and that espionage was being conducted by soldiers who,
although disguised as peasants, were fortunately identiﬁable by their military-
issue underwear. The local population was even thought sufﬁciently fanatic to set
alight its own farm buildings in order to signal the advance of Russian troops to
German forces.112 As General Iurii N. Danilov, the tsarist army’s quartermaster-
general, later conﬁrmed, the conviction that inhabitants were tracking units with
bicycles and reporting their movements by lighting ﬁres, ringing bells, or starting
windmills was ubiquitous: “those who participated in the East Prussian opera-
tions,” he recorded, “testify unanimously to the excellent organization of the
support given to ½German troops by the German population.”113
Such suspicions were based on little but fantasy; even where invaders’ move-
ments were reported to the German military, this was almost entirely due to
1914–1917: Being Chiefly Extracts from the Diary of a Military Attaché ðLondon, 1921Þ,
62 ðdiary entry for August 25, 1914Þ, and Andreas Kuhn, Die Schreckenstage von
Neidenburg: Kriegserinnerungen aus dem Jahre 1914 ðMinden, n.d.Þ, 11–12 and 15–20.
109 For warnings, see, for example, the notice published by the Generalkommando of
XX. Armeekorps as Allensteiner Zeitung, Extra-Ausgabe Nr. 59, August 25, 1914. For the
investigations’ ﬁndings on civilian resistance, see Allenstein report, October 29, 1914. AP
Olsztyn: OP Ostpreußen: 3/528, fol. 62, and Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 208–10.
110 Prusin, Nationalizing a Borderland, 29.
111 For the tsarist army’s “spy mania,” see William C. Fuller Jr., The Foe Within:
Fantasies of Treason and the End of Imperial Russia ðIthaca, NY, 2006Þ.
112 Basil Gourko,War and Revolution in Russia, 1914–1917 ðNewYork, 1919Þ, 26–27
and 36.
113 Youri Danilov, La Russie dans la Guerre Mondiale ð1914–1917Þ, trans. Alexandre
Kaznakov ðParis, 1927Þ, 204.
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impromptu action by postal agents, not members of the public or organized spy
rings.114 The Russians’ delusions nonetheless often had lethal consequences for
808 Watsonthe occupied population. Men caught with military papers or pieces of army
clothing, not unusual in a society with peacetime conscription, were frequently
executed. Some appear to have been killed simply because they were of military
age.115 Cyclists were especially targeted: one Rössel gendarme observed in his
postinvasion report that “the many cyclists ½whom the Russians met on the street
had their bicycles broken up without ceremony and they themselves were also for
the most part shot.”116 Gause estimated that they comprised a full 5 percent of the
victims of Russian atrocities.117 The tsarist army’s preoccupation with spies was
reﬂected in a pattern of violence signiﬁcantly different from that of the Germans
in Belgium and France. “Major incidents,” deﬁned by Horne and Kramer as
atrocities with ten or more deaths, accounted for 80 percent of fatalities in the
west, principally because franc-tireur scares tended to provoke panic and mass
reprisals.118 In contrast, individuals, not communities, were usually punished for
espionage. Only one massacre in East Prussia, the killing of twenty-one people at
Santoppen on August 28 after the village’s church bells had been rung, was
associated with signaling or espionage, and it may in fact have been prompted by
shooting nearby earlier in the day.119 Consequently, “major incidents”were much
rarer in East Prussia: Gause’s study recorded only twenty, in which 378 people
were killed, 25 percent of the total civilian fatalities in the province. Most of the
Russians’ victims were executed individually or in small groups.120
114 For postal agents, see GStA, Berlin: XX. HA Rep. 2II, 3670, reverse of fols. 31–32
and 65. Also Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 200–203.115 See Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 164–69. For witness testimony describing how
Gurko himself examined and ordered the execution as spies of ﬁve youths arrested
with bicycles, draft papers, and a pair of military boots, see Verwaltungsgerichtliche
VernehmungdesAmtsvorstehersBrachvogelausJesziorken,October13,1914.APOlsztyn:
OP Ostpreußen: 3/528, fols. 133–34.
116 Report by Fußgend. Wachtmeister Sahm I, September 14, 1914. AP Olsztyn: RP
Allenstein: 179, fol. 105.
117 Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 161–62.
118 Horne and Kramer, German Atrocities, 74.
119 Report by Oberwachtmeister Meyer, September 17, 1914. AP Olsztyn: RP Allen-
stein: 179, fols. 93–95. For the possibility that the massacre was intended as punishment
for the shooting, see Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 152–54.
120 Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 149–235. These “major incidents” took place at
Santoppen ð21 deadÞ, Gr. Jerutten ð14 deadÞ, Kruglanken ð12 deadÞ, Bischofstein ð36
deadÞ, Lokau ð12 deadÞ, Bartscheiten ð11 deadÞ, Lengainen ð10 deadÞ, Abschwangen ð61
deadÞ, northern part of Pillkallen District in mid-December 1914 ð30 deadÞ, Angerburg on
August 23, 1914 ð16 deadÞ, during the Russian retreat ð10 deadÞ, Christiankehmen ð13
deadÞ, Barannen ð15 deadÞ, Neuendorf ð16 deadÞ, Prostken ð19 deadÞ, Ortelsburg ð34
deadÞ, Sturmhübel ð12deadÞ,Borszymmen ð13deadÞ, Soldau ð10deadÞ, andRumpischken
ð13 deadÞ. Total: 378 dead. If killings in the Memel raid are counted as one major incident,
the total rises to 435 dead.
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The pattern of Russian violence was also shaped by the army’s discipline. To
German ofﬁcials’ surprise, and in stark contrast to the conduct of tsarist troops
Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia 809rampaging in Galicia, this was often good; even the senior president of East
Prussia acknowledged publicly that Rennenkampf had sought to keep his sol-
diers in tight check.121 Isabel Hull may be correct in arguing that the tsarist
military was more concerned with conforming to international legal norms than
was its German opponent. Although, like other forces in 1914, the Russian army
took hostages as guarantors of citizens’ good behavior, none were deliberately
killed.122 Moreover, unlike the Germans, it never used hostages as human
shields.123 This relative moderation is in part attributable to the fact that Russian
commanders were under less pressure to advance quickly than their German
counterparts, who operated under the impossible timetable of the Schlieffen Plan.
However, surviving decrees issued to inhabitants by tsarist ofﬁcers and accounts
by East Prussian ofﬁcials who experienced occupation do testify to some genuine
desire to uphold law and order. The military occupation authorities in Tilsit, for
example, put up posters instructing citizens to report molestation by Russian
soldiers.124 Tsarist commanders not only promised frequently to protect the
population’s lives and property but also punished misbehaving troops harshly:
the Mayor of Neidenburg recalled that during his town’s week-long occupation,
the Russian town commandant ordered six soldiers to be shot and a similar
number publicly whipped for plundering.125 A strict alcohol ban was enforced
121 AccountofspeechbytheOberpräsident inthePrussianAbgeordnetenhaus,March16,
1915, in Paul Schlenther, Zwischen Lindau und Memel während des Krieges ðBerlin,
1915Þ, 92–100. Note that the same was not said of Samsonov; most of the atrocities that
took place during the Russian advance were committed by his army. See Gause, Russen in
Ostpreußen, 212–13. For interest in international legal norms, see Hull, Absolute Destruc-
tion, 129–30.
122 Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 95–96. For German hostage-taking, see Horne and
Kramer,German Atrocities, 9–74 and 76–77. French troops were also instructed in August
1914 to take hostages in occupied territory. Jean-Jacques Becker and Gerd Krumeich, Der
Grosse Krieg: Deutschland und Frankreich im Ersten Weltkrieg, 1914–1918 ðEssen,
2010Þ, 178–79.
123 According toHorne and Kramer, human shields were used in thirty-two cases by the
Germans in France and Belgium. Gause found only two similar cases in East Prussia, and
in neither was the evidence absolutely beyond reproach. See, respectively, Horne and
Kramer, German Atrocities, 76, and Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 103–4.
124 Eduard Pawlowski, ed., Tilsit unter russischer Herrschaft: 26. August bis 12.
September 1914 ðTilsit, ca. 1915Þ, 16.
125 Kuhn, Schreckenstage, 37–38. Rennenkampf ordered that Russian troops caught
plundering should be punished using “the most severe measures, up to and including imme-
diate shooting on the spot.” See his order no. 23 to the First Army, dated August 6, 1914
ðRussian calendarÞ, translated by Joshua Sanborn at http://russianhistoryblog.org/2011/02
/russians-in-east-prussia-1914-pt-2. For the harsh discipline and corporal punishment used
in the tsarist army, see Allan K. Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial Army: The Old
Army and the Soldiers’ Revolt ðMarch–April 1917Þ, 2 vols. ðPrinceton, NJ, 1980Þ, 1:34.
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throughout the army, preventing the inebriation that contributed to some German
atrocities in the west.126 Major massacres were also avoided owing to senior
810 Watsontsarist ofﬁcers’ unwillingness to act peremptorily. Insterburg, which served for
severalweeksasRennenkampf’sheadquarters,wasonecity spared.OnAugust26,
a report that a shot had been ﬁred from one of the city’s houses could have
prompted a violent reaction; instead, however, a proclamation was issued warn-
ing inhabitants that repetitions would be punished by burning to the ground ﬁrst
any house that was the site of shooting, then any street, and ﬁnally the whole
city. When there was an explosion two days later at the municipal waterworks,
the Russians wrongly suspected sabotage, demanded more hostages, yet again
abstained from bloodshed. Even on September 10, the day before the Russians
withdrew and thus a particularly tense time, the army limited itself to burning
down a factory from which revolver shots were said to have been ﬁred. No one
was killed. The discipline imposed by commanders along with, in some cases,
their personal restraint goes far to explain why major cities survived the Russian
invasion largely unscathed. There was no East Prussian equivalent of the Ger-
mans’ notoriously bloody and destructive rampage in Louvain.127
The presence of ofﬁcers was, German ofﬁcials agreed, a crucial factor pre-
venting Russian indiscipline: “where Russian troops lay in large numbers under
supervision less was, as a rule, devastated.”128 This was fortunate for cities but not
for scattered villages in the countryside, where small bands of cavalry roamed
unsupervised and committed acts of “wild” violence. According to East Prussia’s
clergy, it was they who had “stolen, robbed, murdered to their heart’s content.”129
Cossacks, who were responsible for many of the pogroms in Galicia, were
especially feared, but whether their behavior really was exceptionally rapacious
in East Prussia is difﬁcult to determine; antisemitism was not a factor here, and
their training was, after all, identical to that of regular Russian cavalry.130 The
similarity of uniforms, the ferocious appearance of men after several days in the
saddle, and the widely known Cossack reputation for brutality may have
prompted civilians to assume any mounted soldier who committed atrocities to
126 Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 88. Also, Horne and Kramer, German Atrocities,
120–23.
127 OstdeutscheVolkszeitung, ed.,Beiträge zum Einfall der Russen inOstpreußen 1914
aus der Russenzeit in Insterburg ðInsterburg, 1914Þ, posters 5, 14, 23, and “Das Explo-
sionsunglück im städtischen Wasserwerk am Freitag, den 28. August 1914.” For Louvain,
see Horne and Kramer, German Atrocities, 38–42, and Lipkes, Rehearsals, 379–542.
128 Report of Regierungspräsident Königsberg, September 16, 1914. GStA, Berlin:
XX. HA Rep. 2II, 3558, fol. 17.
129 Report of Königliches Konsistorium der Provinz Ostpreußen to Evangelischer Ober-
Kirchenrat in Berlin-Charlottenburg, October 23, 1914. GStA, Berlin: I. HA Rep. 90A,
1059, p. 3 of report.
130 Robert H. McNeal, Tsar and Cossack, 1855–1914 ðBasingstoke, 1987Þ, 50 and
78–79.
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be a Cossack.131 The violence of these unsupervised troops appears rarely to
have been motivated by hatred or racism. The focus of the rank and ﬁle’s ire was
Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia 811not ordinary Germans, but the kaiser; East Prussian ofﬁcials frequently found
that they had poked out the eyes in his ofﬁcial portraits or otherwise mutilated
them.132 Misunderstandings between troops and inhabitants may sometimes have
led to aggression, but the knowledge of Polish possessed by many on both sides
probably made this less of a problem, at least in the south of the province, than
in Belgium and France.133 Instead, the violence was often related to looting. To
peasant-soldiers from impoverished rural Russia, East Prussia appeared spectac-
ularly rich; even their ofﬁcers were impressed with the “astonishing amount of
rural wealth.”134 Moreover, the army’s utterly inadequate logistical preparation
for the campaign meant that troops were often hungry, and the need to requisition
food offered an excuse to enter dwellings and then to steal, rape, or murder.135
Finally, reverses on the battleﬁeld greatly exacerbated violence both by small
groups of soldiers and by larger units under ofﬁcers. Samsonov’s troops commit-
ted many of their worst atrocities in the confusion of the last days of Tannen-
berg.136 The subsequent retreat of Rennenkampf ’s army, which was far more
traumatic than the almost contemporaneous but more limited German withdrawal
in the west after the Entente victory on the Marne, was also bloody. The force’s
supply chain collapsed and discipline among the frightened and frustrated sol-
diers faltered. The chaos and danger further inﬂamed lethal delusions of civilian
resistance. Half of all civilians killed in Gumbinnen District and more than three-
ﬁfths in neighboring Darkehmen died during the retreat. It was the southeastern
131 See, for example, Max von Gallwitz, Meine Führertätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/
1916: Belgien–Osten–Balkan ðBerlin, 1929Þ, 30 ðentry for September 3, 1914Þ. Cf. Traba,
“Wschodniopruskość,” 252–55.
132 See Oberförster Pietsch-Grünﬂiess, “Bericht über die während der russischen
Besetzung von Grünﬂiess in der Zeit vom 23.–29. August d.Js. gehabten Erlebnisse bezw.
Eindrücke.” GStA, Berlin: XX. HA Rep. 2II, 3560, reverse of fol. 26. Also Gause, Russen
in Ostpreußen, 28–29. Russian troops’ hatred of the kaiser was probably incited by
propaganda. See Hubertus F. Jahn, “Die Germanen. Perzeptionen des Kriegsgegners in
Russland zwischen Selbst- und Feindbild,” in Die vergessene Front: Der Osten 1914/15;
Ereignis, Wirkung, Nachwirkung, ed. Gerhard P. Groß ðPaderborn, 2006Þ, 173 and 176–
77.
133 This was highlighted by the Landrat of Rössel. See his report of September 21,
1914. AP Olsztyn: RPAllenstein: 179, fol. 11.
134 Gourko, War and Revolution, 41.
135 See Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive, 192–93. For cases of looting- or requisition-
related violence, see the Gumbinnen and Allenstein County reports, September 25 and
October 29, 1914. AP Olsztyn: OP Ostpreußen: 3/528, fols. 44, 46, 48, 57–60, 69–70, and
72.
136 These includedmassacresbyretreating troops inOrtelsburgandSoldauonAugust28,
1914. Other atrocities on this and the next day, such as massacres at Santoppen and
Bischofstein, were committed by units still advancing. See Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen,
212–13 and 218.
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corner of the province that suffered most in terms of absolute numbers of
fatalities, however.137 Prostken, a small town of 3,000 people in Lyck District,
812 Watsonillustrates how horriﬁc the destruction could be in this period. Beginning on
September 8, and continuing through the night, the town was plundered by
retreating Russian troops, assisted by Polish civilians from across the border. All
but eight houses were demolished. Property and livestock were taken; some
inhabitants were forced to drive their own cattle and horses into Russia. People
were deported ð272Þ or massacred ðnineteenÞ; the rest of the citizens ﬂed. All that
was left on liberation, reported the local gendarme, was “a pile of rubble.”138
Examination of Russian violence in East Prussia in 1914–15 reveals German
atrocities in Belgium and northern France at the war’s opening to be much less
exceptional than is usually claimed. For the tsarist army, like its German enemy,
preconceptions of civilian hostility were crucial in engendering violence. As in
the west, those preconceptions received apparent conﬁrmation through the dis-
orientating conditions of modern mobile combat. Soldiers and junior ofﬁcers in
both forces reacted with bloody reprisals, sanctioned by higher commanders. The
two armies’ fantasies and conduct were not identical: the tsarist army’s greater
fear of spies than of francs-tireurs, the restraint of some of its senior ofﬁcers, the
marauding by unsupervised soldiers in the countryside, and a traumatic retreat all
affected its patterns of violence. Nonetheless, Russian behavior in East Prussia
offers little support for the view that the German military was unusually brutal.
The incidence of civilian fatalities in the west was no greater than in East Prussia.
Instead, the most signiﬁcant distinction between Russian and German atrocities
may lie in the greater dynamism and persistence of the tsarist force’s bloodletting.
The kaiser’s army, for all its reputed tendency to embrace spiraling scripts of
violence, rapidly overcame its delusions of francs-tireurs and had all but ceased
attacks on Belgian and French civilians by the mid-autumn of 1914. Russia’s
military, by contrast, proved more dysfunctional, and more radical. Descending
ever deeper into an obsessive and largely irrational spy fever, it reacted in the
winter of 1914–15 by initiating the mass deportation, often in lethal conditions, of
men, women, and children belonging to suspect populations.
IV
The Russian army’s invasions of East Prussia, and the atrocities that it committed
there, had a formative impact on Germans’ understanding of what was at stake in
the First World War. Already at the beginning of August 1914, after the tsar
137 Ibid., 217–19.
138 Reports by Fußgendarmerie-Wachtmeister Mattern I, September 21, 22, and 25,
1914. AP Olsztyn: RPAllenstein: 179, fols. 213–14 and 219–28. Also, for the ﬁgures of
killed and deported, which differ from those in the gendarmerie reports, see Gause, Russen
in Ostpreußen, 191.
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ordered his armies to mobilize against the Reich, Germans had rallied behind
their government, convinced of the defensive nature of the struggle and deter-
Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia 813mined not to “allow the soil of the Fatherland to be overrun and devastated by
Russian regiments.”139 When, shortly afterward, East Prussia was invaded, the
shock reverberated across the country. The fear, horror, and outrage felt weremost
famously expressed in the October 1914 appeal of ninety-three German intellec-
tuals “To the Civilized World,” which complained emotionally of “earth . . .
saturated with the blood of women and children unmercifully butchered by the
wild Russian troops.”140 The intensity of the emotions needs to be acknowledged,
for they lay at the core of the patriotic and defensive solidarity mythologized as
the “spirit of 1914.”141 They also account for the remarkably immediate, univer-
sal, and enduring popularity of Hindenburg after Tannenberg. So frighteningwere
the invasions and atrocity stories that Germans revered him as a “savior,” an
image that remained central to his cult during and long after the conﬂict.142
The trauma of East Prussia’s invasion was transmitted through several channels
to the wider German populace in 1914. The press was critically important in
disseminating news of Russian assault. Ingrained stereotypes of Russia as uncul-
tured, barbaric, and Asiatic had primed newspapers to expect that invasion from
the east would be brutal; Social Democratic papers, for example, predicted
already on August 1, 1914, at the opening of hostilities with Russia, that the
“motley peoples of the tsar” would be unlikely to keep to civilized norms of
warfare. “We do not want our women and children to become victims of Cossack
bestiality,” they warned.143 Nonetheless, once Russian attacks on East Prussia
began, the German press’s reporting was far more balanced than most historians
have supposed.144 In August, atrocity stories were published only sporadically
139 Berliner Tageblatt und Handels-Zeitung 43. Jahrgang, Nr. 387, Morgen-Ausgabe
ðAugust 2, 1914Þ, 1.140 Jürgen von Ungern-Sternberg and Wolfgang von Ungern-Sternberg, Der Aufruf
“An die Kulturwelt!” Das Manifest der 93 und die Anfänge der Kriegspropaganda im
Ersten Weltkrieg: Mit einer Dokumentation ðStuttgart, 1996Þ, 162.
141 Verhey, Spirit of 1914, esp. 72–185. The perception of Russian aggression was
particularly important in bringing Germany’s Social Democrats to support the war effort.
See Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden und Klassenkampf: Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie im
Ersten Weltkrieg ðDüsseldorf, 1974,Þ, 55 and 69–71.
142 Anna von der Goltz and Robert Gildea, “Flawed Saviours: The Myths of Hinden-
burg and Pétain,” European History Quarterly 39 ð2009Þ: 439–64. Also, von der Goltz,
Hindenburg, esp. 16–17 and 22–23.
143 Quotation from Friedrich Stämpfer’s inﬂuential article “Sein oder Nichtsein!,”
which ﬁrst appeared on July 31 and was published widely by the Social Democratic press
in subsequent days. See Wolfgang Kruse, Krieg und nationale Integration: Eine Neuin-
terpretation des sozialdemokratischen Burgfriedensschlusses 1914/15 ðEssen, 1993Þ, 53,
72, and 240–42, endnote 206.
144 See, for example, DavidWelch,Germany, Propaganda and Total War, 1914–1918:
The Sins of Omission ðLondon, 2000Þ, 61, and Becker and Krumeich, Grosse Krieg, 184–
85.
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and generally appeared in letters from the front written by private individuals, not
in articles backed by journalistic authority.145 Far from being inventions of ofﬁcial
814 Watsonpropaganda, the state suppressed such accounts as the attack developed. Theodor
Wolff, editor of the inﬂuential Berliner Tageblatt, noted in his diary onAugust 25,
“harrowing letters from East Prussia. Nothing allowed to be published.”146 Fear
that atrocity stories would cause mass panic probably prompted the ban. News-
papers instead adopted a tone of forced optimism: “Good Outlook Also in the
East” promised the Frankfurter Zeitung as the tsarist army advanced into East
Prussia.147 Information about the Russian attack was nonetheless sufﬁciently
detailed and frightening to ensure that victory at Tannenberg was greeted with
almost hysterical relief. On Berlin’s Potsdamer Platz, Wolff witnessed on
August 30 “unbelievable enthusiasm” as the extra edition reporting the triumph
was snatched from vendors’ hands, individuals were lifted up by the crowd to
read it aloud, and thousands of people together celebrated the liberation.148
From September, once the threat posed by invasion had receded owing to
Hindenburg’s victories and more reliable information became available from the
newly freed territory, newspapers were able to write extensively on Russian
atrocities.149 Drawing on prewar stereotypes of Russia, many commentators
portrayed the violence as “the introduction of Asiatic barbarism onto German
soil.”150 Nonetheless, their reports were far from wholly one-sided. TheDeutsche
Kriegszeitung, for example, which at the end of August had denounced tsarist
145 See the “letter of a German ofﬁcer” as well as the summary of a similar private
account of atrocities in the Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt 58. Jahrgang, Nr. 228,
Erstes Morgenblatt ðAugust 18, 1914Þ, 2. These were originally published in the Berliner
Tageblatt and the Hamburger Fremdenblatt. Editorial conﬁdence in the veracity of these
accounts was probably strengthened by Germany’s ofﬁcial warning to the Russian gov-
ernment regarding the conduct of troops in East Prussia, notice of which appeared on the
front page of the same day’s Frankfurter Zeitung.
146 Theodor Wolff, Tagebücher 1914–1919: Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Entstehung
der Weimarer Republik in Tagebüchern, Leitartikeln und Briefen des Chefredakteurs am
“Berliner Tageblatt” und Mitbegründers der “Deutschen Demokratischen Partei,” ed.
Bernd Sösemann, 2 vols. ðBoppard am Rhein, 1984Þ, 1:91 ðdiary entry for August 25,
1914Þ.
147 “Gute Aussichten auch im Osten,” Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt 58.
Jahrgang, Nr. 235, Zweites Morgenblatt ðAugust 25, 1914Þ, 1.
148 Wolff, Tagebücher 1914–1919, 1:96 ðdiary entry for August 30, 1914Þ. Cf. also the
fourth “Stimmungsbericht” of Polizeipräsident in Berlin, September 2, 1914. BA Berlin-
Lichterfelde: R43/2398, fol. 138.
149 This is reﬂected in the press extracts inKriegsdokumente: Der Weltkrieg 1914/15 in
der Darstellung der zeitgenössischen Presse, ed. Eberhard Buchner, 9 vols. ðMunich,
1915Þ, 2 and 3, index entries for “Ostpreußen” and “Kriegsgreuel.”A detailed examination
of the Liegnitzer Zeitung, Deutsche Kriegszeitung, and Frankfurter Zeitung also conﬁrmed
it.
150 Vossische Zeitung, quoted in “Russische Greuel,” Frankfurter Zeitung und Han-
delsblatt 59. Jahrgang, Nr. 253, Abendblatt ðSeptember 12, 1914Þ, 1. Cf. Paddock,
Creating the Russian Peril, 192–93.
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troops as “robbers, murderers, and arsonists,” acknowledged in mid-September
that not all Russians were alike: the Cossacks, certainly, had been brutal, yet the
Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia 815typical guard ofﬁcer was credited with “a breeding and ﬁneness of conduct which
would not allow him to look on the excesses of his subordinates quiescently.”151
The reports were frequently factually accurate; newspapers printed accounts by
provincial ofﬁcials well placed to explain the atrocities. The Frankfurter Zeitung
used such testimony to report on Russian violence in Labiau, the bombardment of
Neidenburg, and the Abschwangen massacre.152 Magazines published sketches
and photographs of ﬂeeing civilians and ruined towns, assisting readers from
other parts of Germany to empathize with the East Prussians’ plight.153 Press
reports stressed that the invasions had endangered the entire nation: the suffering
and sacriﬁces of the population in the province had been undergone, the public
was told, “in the interest of the whole Fatherland.”154
Accounts of the violence in East Prussia were also disseminated through more
personal channels. The units that fought in the province, although nominally
local, contained high proportions of soldiers from other parts of Germany: over
two-thirds of the men in the First Army Corps, for example, came from West-
phalia and Brandenburg.155 Through their letters, these troops passed on their
shock at the destruction to relatives far removed from the ﬁghting. “The war is
very hard for our poor East Prussians,” one war volunteer told his parents in
Saxony at the end of August, describing for them the sight of burning farms,
abandoned villages, and starving cattle.156 Soldiers liberating the province
151 Deutsche Kriegszeitung, Nr. 3 ðAugust 30, 1914Þ, 5, and Nr. 5 ðSeptember 13,
1914Þ, 5. This was not an isolated example. For other acknowledgments of good Russian
behavior, see “Die Besetzung des Postamts Eydtkuhnen durch die Russen,” Liegnitzer
Zeitung, 79. Jahrgang, Nr. 196. 1 Beilage ðAugust 22, 1914Þ, “Hilfe für die Provinz
Ostpreußen” and “Die Verwüstungen in Ostpreußen” in, respectively, Frankfurter Zeitung
und Handelsblatt 59. Jahrgang, Nr. 246, Zweites Morgenblatt ðSeptember 5, 1914Þ, 2, and
Nr. 55, Zweites Morgenblatt ðFebruary 24, 1915Þ, 2.
152 See “Wie die Russen in Ostpreußen hausten,” “Hilfe für die Provinz Ostpreußen,”
and “Russische Greuel,” in, respectively, Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt 59.
Jahrgang, Nr. 256, Abendblatt ðSeptember 15, 1914Þ, 2, Nr. 246, Zweites Morgenblatt
ðSeptember 5, 1914Þ, 2, and Nr. 249, Zweites Morgenblatt ðSeptember 8, 1914Þ, 2.
153 See, for example, “Rückkehr ostpreußischer Flüchtlinge in ihr zerstörtes Dorf ” and
“Geiseln,” in Illustrierte Geschichte des Weltkrieges 1914/15: Allgemeine Kriegszeitung,
31. Heft, 120 and 38. Heft ðn.d.Þ, 260;Deutsche Kriegszeitung, Nr. 4 ðSeptember 6, 1914Þ,
8, Nr. 6 ðSeptember 20, 1914Þ, 5, and Nr. 8 ðOctober 4, 1914Þ, 6; and the many
photographs published from December 1914 onward in Illustrierte Ostdeutsche Kriegs-
Zeitung. Unlike Entente propaganda on German atrocities in France and Belgium, graphic
portrayals of violence against civilians do not appear to have been published in the Reich.
Illustrators concentrated instead on refugees and material destruction in East Prussia.
154 “Der russische Einfall in Ostpreußen,” Liegnitzer Zeitung, 79. Jahrgang, Nr. 198. 1
Beilage ðAugust 25, 1914Þ. Cf. Deutsche Kriegszeitung, Nr. 6 ðSeptember 20, 1914Þ, 2.
155 Showalter, Tannenberg, 142–43.
156 Kriegsfreiwilliger Gustav K., letter to parents, August 31, 1914. BA-MA Freiburg,
MSg 2/3788.
This content downloaded from 158.223.21.100 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 10:02:11 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
sometimes found civilian corpses and, more frequently, heard from inhabitants of
their suffering under the “devilish opponent.”157 Perhaps because they were
816 Watsontraumatized by battle or projecting fears of mutilation or anxieties about their
own masculinity, combatants were especially prone to exaggerate these accounts
or invent wholly imaginary tales of Russian sadism toward women and chil-
dren.158 These stories traveled rearward, causing men not yet in action to expect
enemy inhumanity and to interpret what they saw on the battleﬁeld in this light. In
Landwehr Infantry Regiment 76, for example, a unit recruited around Hamburg,
troops were outraged by stories of Russians slicing off women’s breasts and
nailing down children even before they reached East Prussia at the end of
August.159
The vicarious experience of invasion was intensiﬁed by the fact that many
Germans far removed from East Prussia not only read of but actually came face to
face with victims of the Russian attacks. Large movements of civilians westward
within Germany, although rarelymentioned in the historiography, were a deﬁning
part of the war experience in 1914. During the summer attack, more than 800,000
East Prussians ﬂed their homes.160 Most hid in local forests, headed for Königs-
berg, or took their cattle and struggled across to neighboring West Prussia, but
well over 30,000 traveled by rail over the Vistula to Berlin, Brandenburg, Pom-
erania, and beyond.161 During the second invasion in November, the impact on
the rest of the country was even greater as, assisted by a well-organized evacu-
ation, a quarter of a million East Prussian refugees, out of a total of 350,000,
spread across Germany. Chartered trains brought 34,000 to Pomerania, 21,000
to Schleswig, and 20,000 to both Lüneburg and Danzig. Another 25,000 went
157 Unterofﬁzier der Reserve Nikolaus B., diary/memoir, September 11 ðadditional
noteÞ and 22, 1914. Deutsches Tagebucharchiv, Emmendingen ðhereafter DTAÞ: 1610, 1.
158 For an example, see the testimony of Wehrmann August Schult, January 24, 1915,
in AP Olsztyn: RPAllenstein: 179, fol. 465. Cf. Auswärtiges Amt, Greueltaten russischer
Truppen, esp. Anlagen 35, 39, 40, 41, and 74, and Gause, “Quellen zur Geschichte,” 87. A
similar tendency for soldiers to invent stories of extreme brutality against women and
children was also witnessed on the French side. See Ruth Harris, “The ‘Child of the
Barbarian’: Rape, Race and Nationalism in France during the First World War,” Past &
Present 141 ð1993Þ: 170–206, esp. 186–91.
159 See Heinrich Holsten, ed., Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment 76 im Weltkriege ðStade,
1938Þ, 17–18. In this case, the stories came from East Prussian refugees, but similar tales
were spread, for example, by some ofﬁcers. See the testimony of Musketier Fritz Wamp,
January 23, 1915, in AP Olsztyn: RPAllenstein: 180, fols. 203–4.
160 Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918: Die Befreiung Ostpreußens, 14 vols.
ðBerlin, 1925Þ, 2:329. The magnitude of the refugee movement is conﬁrmed by contem-
porary ﬁgures in “Besichtigung der durch die Russeneinfällen beschädigten Teile der
Provinz Ostpreußen durch die Minister ½Staatsministerium,” ca. mid-April 1915. GStA,
Berlin: I. HA Rep. 90A, 1064.
161 Letter from Minister des Innern to Finanzminister, September 3, 1914. BA Berlin-
Lichterfelde: R43/2465d, reverse of fol. 21. Cf. Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 59–62.
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to Frankfurt an der Oder, 12,000 to Potsdam, and 6,000 across the country to
Osnabrück. Most were accommodated with private persons, not isolated in
Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia 817barracks. A further 80,000 East Prussians used ordinary branch trains to reach
safety, most going to Berlin or Westphalia.162 These refugees were even more
important than the press in disseminating accounts of Russian brutality; their
claims that “the Russians had murdered women and children in East Prussia,”
tortured civilians, and burned habitations were already being passed by word of
mouth and discussed across Germany from August 1914.163
Not only refugees but also military evacuees from the east brought the invasion
to central and western Germans. At the beginning of November 1914, with a
second invasion looming, the Prussian War Ministry ordered that recruits not yet
posted to units and the three premilitary year groups of seventeen- to nineteen-
year-olds living in threatened areas on the eastern frontier should be removed to
safety. The scale of this evacuation is today difﬁcult to ascertain, but it was
certainly substantial, for it embraced not only East Prussia but also parts of the
border provinces of Posen, Silesia, and probably West Prussia. While some men
were transported a relatively short distance into the interior of these provinces,
many were taken to Brandenburg, Prussian Saxony, Pomerania, Hannover, and
Schleswig Holstein. More than 17,000 were sent to the Province of Hessen-
Nassau in the west of Germany.164 The measure was probably intended to avoid a
repetition of the deportations of military-aged men undertaken by the Russians
during their ﬁrst incursion into East Prussia. Yet to an excited and anxious public,
the movement of so many youths was a conﬁrmation of more macabre fantasies
about the invader’s brutality. One rumor had it that the evacuation was necessi-
tated by tsarist troops’ practice of hacking off the hands of healthy German
males.165
162 Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 69–70. Also, “Die ostpreußischen Flüchtlinge,”
Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt 59. Jahrgang, Nr. 326, Abendblatt ðNovember 24,
1914Þ, 2.
163 See Piete Kuhr, There We’ll Meet Again: The First World War Diary of a Young
German Girl, trans. Walter Wright ðn.p., 1998Þ, 18 ðentry for August 9, 1914Þ and 42
ðentry for September 10, 1914Þ. Also ðillustrating how quickly such stories spread to
central and western GermanyÞ, Princess Evelyn Blücher, An English Wife in Berlin: A
Private Memoir of Events, Politics and Daily Life in Germany throughout the War and the
Social Revolution of 1918 ðNewYork, 1920Þ, 21 ðentry forAugust 26, 1914Þ, andHildeG.,
diary, August 27, 1914. DTA: 700/I.
164 Correspondence between stellv. Gen.Kdo. XVIII. Armeekorps, Oberpräsident in
Cassel and Regierungspräsident in Wiesbaden, November 15–19, 1914, fols. 15–17, and
order from Kriegsministerium to stellv. Gen.Kdo. II., III., IV., V., VI., IX., X. and XVIII.
Armeekorps, December 12, 1914, fol. 234. The order to evacuate was issued on
November 4, 1914. HHStA Wiesbaden: Preußisches Regierungspräsidium Wiesbaden
ð405Þ, no. 8364.
165 Major Artur Hausner, diary ðvol. 2Þ, November 16, 1914 ðp. 18Þ. Kriegsarchiv
Vienna: Nachläße: B/217 Hausner.
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The intense emotions generated throughout Germany by soldiers’ letters, press
reports of the Russian invasions, and contact with refugees and evacuees found
818 Watsonexpression in an enormous fund-raising effort for East Prussia. After appeals by
the mayor of Königsberg and the provincial senior president, donations poured in
across the Reich. The nation drew together as municipalities from Breslau to
Bremen offered tens of thousands of marks to the beleaguered province.166 The
king of Saxony and his government pledged 250,000 marks.167 Private individ-
uals of all classes were also keen to demonstrate solidarity: in Frankfurt am
Main, for example, donors ranged from Professor K. Borchardt ð200 marksÞ and
factory director E. Weber ð100 marksÞ through to tram conductor J. Müller and
senior post assistant Vorgt ðten marks eachÞ. Class IIIB of the Elizabeth School
raised twenty-ﬁve marks, but the city’s “Wednesday Pub Regulars’ Citizens’
Association” did rather better, collecting ﬁfty-two marks.168 Voluntary efforts
were soon centralized into the Ostpreußenhilfe: Verband Deutscher Kriegshilfs-
vereine für zerstörte ostpreußische Städte und Ortschaften ðEast Prussia Aid:
Union of German War-Assistance Associations for Destroyed East Prussian
Cities and TownsÞ. A sponsorship system was organized whereby communities
in western and central Germany adopted East Prussian towns or districts. The city
and surroundings of Cologne raised funds to help rebuild Neidenburg District,
Oppeln County sponsored Lyck, and Frankfurt am Main supported Lötzen.169
Picture books and postcards portraying the destruction, songs dedicated to East
Prussia, and multifarious war kitsch ranging fromwall calendars to porcelain kept
the province in the public eye and offered Germans the chance to demonstrate
their feelings of solidarity.170 The campaign’s spectacular success testiﬁes to how
closely the Reich’s citizens identiﬁed with the invasion’s victims: by May 1916,
more than twelve million marks had been raised by the Ostpreußenhilfe.171
166 See the notices in Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt, esp. 59. Jahrgang, Nr.
244, Zweites Morgenblatt ðSeptember 3, 1914Þ, 2, and Abendblatt ðSeptember 3, 1914Þ, 3,
Nr. 247, Zweites Morgenblatt ðSeptember 6, 1914Þ, Nr. 254, Erstes Morgenblatt
ðSeptember 13, 1914Þ, 2. Also, telegram of Präsident des Senats der freien Hansestadt
Bremen, September 5, 1914. GStA, Berlin: I. HA Rep. 90A, 1059.
167 Letter of sächsisches Ministerium der auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, September 8,
1914. BA Berlin-Lichterfelde R43/2465d, fol. 15.
168 See the lists entitled “Ostpreußensammlung” and “Hilfe für Ostpreußen” published
regularly in the Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt. The donors mentioned here
appeared in the 59. Jahrgang, Nr. 249, Zweites Morgenblatt ðSeptember 8, 1914Þ and Nr.
271, Zweites Morgenblatt ðSeptember 30, 1914Þ.
169 Andreas Kossert, Ostpreußen: Geschichte und Mythos ðMunich, 2005Þ, 204–7.
170 See the ﬁles requesting permission to sell a range of goods for the beneﬁt of East
Prussia in GStA, Berlin: I. HA Rep. 191, esp. 3211, 3212, 3215, 3216, 3217, and 3222.
171 Ostpreußisches Landesmuseum Lüneburg, ed., Die Ostpreußenhilfe im Ersten
Weltkrieg: Zur Ausstellung “Zum Besten der Ostpreußenhilfe” ð23.9.2006–28.1.2007Þ
ðHusum, 2006Þ, 16.
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The vicarious invasion transmitted to Germans through press reports, soldiers’
letters, and ﬁrsthand contact with East Prussians united the populace behind their
Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia 819country’s war effort in 1914. Yet the mobilizing potential of the experience ended
neither with the celebrations and thanksgiving church services that marked the
second liberation in February nor with the outrage provoked by the ﬁnal Rus-
sian assault on Memel in March 1915.172 Perpetuated by memoirs, histories,
and even some best-selling novels and children’s literature, as well as by the
Ostpreußenhilfe, the memory and fear of invasion remained potent.173 In the
autumn of 1917, when war weariness, polarization over war aims, and disap-
pointment at the U-boats’ failure to achieve quick victory brought civilian morale
to a nadir, the government sought to exploit this fear in order to renew public
resolve.174 The Seventh War Loan campaign took as its central theme the preda-
tory objectives of the Reich’s opponents and warned that failure to subscribe
would lead to invasion, this time from the west. The propaganda illustrated the
threat by recalling East Prussia’s suffering at Russian hands in 1914–15: one
leaﬂet reminded its readers of the “robbery, murder, arson, and rape” that had
taken place in the province. Another, featuring a dramatic drawing of British
cavalrymen beating and looting from German peasants that was strongly remi-
niscent of accounts of Cossack behavior in East Prussia, prompted its readers to
imagine a future in which “German land should, as once in East Prussia, be laid
waste and destroyed” ðﬁg. 2Þ.175 Even a short ﬁlm was made that drew on the
northeasterly province’s recent history in order to advertise the war loan. The
172 For the celebrations and services, see Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt 59.
Jahrgang, Nr. 49, Zweites Morgenblatt ðFebruary 18, 1915Þ, 1, and Nr. 51, Zweites
Morgenblatt ðFebruary 20, 1915Þ, 2. Commentary on the Memel raid can be found in
Deutsche Kriegszeitung, Nr. 13 ðMarch 28, 1915Þ, 4–6. For more personal reﬂections, see
the diary of Ruth H. ða fourteen-year-old from Upper SilesiaÞ, fols. 9–11 ðentries of
February 18 and 23, 1915Þ. DTA: 1280, 1.
173 Jahn, “Zarendreck, Barbarendreck,” 229–33. Jahn highlights the success of Richard
Skowronnek’s novelMorgenrot ðBerlin and Vienna, 1916Þ, half a million copies of which
had been published by 1934.
174 See the “Chart of German Civilian Morale” plotted by the Military Intelligence
Division of the USWar Department, General Staff, reproduced in George G. Bruntz, Allied
Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918 ðStanford, CA, 1938Þ, insert
between 192–93. For conditions on the home front in this period, see Belinda J. Davis,
Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin ðChapel
Hill, NC, 2000Þ, esp. 190–218.
175 See the leaﬂets “Zukunft des deutschen Landwirts im Falle eines englischen
Sieges!” and “Der Feind im Land!” and cf. “Wie brennt die Wunde—brennt die
Schmach!,” all in Württembergische Landesbibliothek/Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte,
Stuttgart: Flugblattsammlung–7. Kriegsanleihe ð1917Þ. Also the front page of the pam-
phlet “Die 7. Kriegsanleihe” in HStA Stuttgart: J150 Nr. 232/8. Hindenburg, the savior of
East Prussia, featured heavily too in the campaign’s appeal. See Welch, Germany, Propa-
ganda and Total War, 210.
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Fig. 2.—“Der Feind im Land!” ð“The Enemy in the Country!”Þ. Front page of a propa-
ganda ﬂier issued for the Seventh War Loan, autumn 1917. Original in color. Courtesy of
Württembergische Landesbibliothek/Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte, Stuttgart. Flugblatt-
sammlung—7. Kriegsanleihe ð1917Þ.
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drama showed a wealthy and contented farmer’s family in East Prussia suddenly
disturbed by the cry “the Russians are coming.” As the staging directions ex-
Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia 821plained: “Cossacks and Russians rush like animals into the village, burning and
laying waste to everything in their path—the terriﬁed inhabitants want to save
themselves from the sea of ﬂames—but mercilessly the Cossacks throw them
back into the blazing ﬁre, pull women and children onto the road and pitilessly
knock down all who approach them to plead. . . . They pay no attention to the
whimpering women—the screams for help of following children echo unceas-
ingly in the ears.” For Germans not wishing to see these scenes repeated in 1917,
the message was clear: “Yes, we must support our Fatherland with money!”176
Equally signiﬁcantly, East Prussia also provided the inspiration for the major
media event of 1917: the release of the motion picture Ostpreußen und sein
Hindenburg ðEast Prussia and Its HindenburgÞ. A lavish costume drama produced
at a time of severe textile shortages, the ﬁlm required an army of extras and
featured both the kaiser and Hindenburg. It was billed, justly, as “the greatest
national sensation ﬁlm of the present.”177 The ﬁlm told a story of East Prussia,
beginning with its heathen past and its cultural development by the Teutonic
Knights. The German claim to the land having been established, the focus then
switched to the Napoleonic period, the humiliations of 1806–7, and the trium-
phant liberation of Prussia from occupation in 1813. The ﬁnal part, the ﬁlm’s
“dramatic high point” in the opinion of one critic, then took the viewer into the
province’s most recent history. Accompanied by a stirring soundtrack, the screen
displayed East Prussia’s invasion in 1914 and the atrocities committed by the
“Russian hordes.” Far from exaggerating, these scenes were, according to an
educationalist asked to comment on the picture, “too true to life.” Yet, he contin-
ued, “these facts are now common knowledge, and we cannot allow ourselves to
balk at looking these things in the face.” The ﬁlm ended on a high note, with the
province’s deliverance through the advance of Germany’s victorious soldiers
under Hindenburg. As they left the cinema, spectators should have been ﬁlled
with the conviction that, just as East Prussia had passed through adversity in 1813
and 1914 and had been redeemed, so too Germany would hold out in its present
struggle and its greatness would be resurrected.178
176 Staging directions for Der Heimat-Schützengraben ð1916Þ, reproduced in Ulrike
Oppelt, Film und Propaganda im Ersten Weltkrieg: Propaganda als Medienrealität im
Aktualitäten- und Dokumentarfilm ðStuttgart, 2002Þ, 337–38. The ﬁlm was shot as an
advertisement for the Sixth War Loan but was reused in the Seventh War Loan campaign.
See Jette Kilian, “Propaganda für die deutschen Kriegsanleihen im Ersten Weltkrieg,” in
Massenmedien und Spenden-kampagnen: Vom 17. Jahrhundert bis in die Gegenwart, ed.
Jürgen Wilke ðCologne, 2008Þ, 136–37.
177 See the advertisement in Der Film, Nr. 7 ðFebruary 17, 1917Þ, 6–7. I am extremely
grateful to Dr. Philipp Stiasny for his generosity in providing me with copies of articles and
advertisements from Der Film.
178 Articles inDer Film, Nr. 2 ðJanuary 13, 1917Þ, 29, andNr. 9 ðMarch 3, 1917Þ, 35–36.
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Although evaluating the effectiveness of this propaganda is difﬁcult, there are
indications that it did fulﬁll its purpose. Ostpreußen und sein Hindenburg re-
822 Watsonceived enthusiastic reviews from critics and won audiences’ approval. One
ﬁfteen-year-old described the experience of seeing it as “absolutely lovely” and
many others agreed: according to a Düsseldorf cinema, the ﬁlm’s ﬁrst run of
screenings was a “great success.”179 The army certainly believed that it had
stiffened morale. Noting the public’s positive reactions at showings, the Deputy
Command of the First Army Corps in Königsberg praised the ﬁlm for having
“raised and strengthened understanding for total endurance.”180 Similarly, al-
though the Seventh War Loan campaign could not resolve sharpening societal
divisions and exhaustion, its attempt to inspire fear of renewed invasion by
reactivating traumatic memories from 1914–15 may well have helped to remo-
bilize Germans for another year of ﬁghting. Apart from the Sixth War Loan,
which had been advertised when expectations of a quick victory through unre-
stricted submarine warfare were at a peak, no previous war loan had more sub-
scribers or raised so much money. Despite the poor prospects for victory—the
loan was advertised before Russia’s Bolshevik Revolution—and the approach of
a second “turnip winter,” the Seventh War Loan attracted more than ﬁve and a
half million signatures and raised over twelve billion marks.181
The invasions of East Prussia were a central part of Germans’ experience in the
ﬁrst months of hostilities. Through newspapers, soldiers’ letters, refugees, and
evacuees, people throughout the Reich underwent a vicarious invasion. This af-
fected the country profoundly. In 1914, it played a crucial role in rallyingGermans
behind their leaders for a defensive struggle.While this unity ultimately collapsed
under the strain of war, the shared memories and myths of trauma that were also
bequeathed by the experience provedmore durable. Even in 1917, they could help
to drive Germans to further sacriﬁce in order to avoid renewed invasion and
occupation.
V
The Russian army perpetrated grievous acts of violence against noncombatants
during its invasions of East Prussia at the opening of the First World War. By the
time of the province’s ﬁnal liberation in March 1915, 1,491 German civilians had
been deliberately killed and hundreds more raped by tsarist troops. Over 13,000,
179 Diary of IngeborgW., entry of October 24, 1917. DTA: 1494/I, and letter fromAsta-
Nielsen-Lichtspiele GmbH in Düsseldorf to Eiko-Film GmbH, reproduced in Der Film,
Nr. 16 ðApril 21, 1917Þ, 31.
180 See letter from Chef des Stabes of stellvertretendes Generalkommando des I.
Armeekorps to the Eiko-Film GmbH, published in Der Film, Nr. 16 ðApril 21, 1917Þ, 30.
181 Konrad Roesler, Die Finanzpolitik des Deutschen Reiches im Ersten Weltkrieg
ðBerlin, 1967Þ, 79 and 207.
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almost half of whom were women and children, had been brutally ripped from
their homes and deported into the depths of the tsar’s empire. Only two-thirds of
Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia 823these deportees would survive their wartime captivity. The invasions had been
accompanied by widespread looting and devastation. More than 100,000 build-
ings had been damaged or destroyed, most in heavy ﬁghting but some as a result
of military reprisals or after being plundered. East Prussia’s few cities had escaped
serious harm, but over one-quarter of its farms and villages and three-ﬁfths of its
small towns were scarred or ruined.182
This “unheard-of brutality” was not so exceptional as the Reich’s deputy
chancellor Delbrück believed. Similar violence was in fact being committed con-
temporaneously against civilians by militaries all across Europe in 1914. Close
structural parallels exist between Russian actions in East Prussia and the more
famous German “atrocities.” In both armies, preconceptions of civilian hostility
formulated in peacetime were activated by the shock of modern, mobile warfare.
Although patterns of violence differed, Russian, like German, troops responded
aggressively and senior commanders authorized bloody reprisals and punish-
ments. Moreover, while more research is needed, there are already strong in-
dications that neither force was unusually brutal. The Austro-Hungarian army
outmatched both its ally and its principal enemy in viciousness. It killed 3,500 Ser-
bian civilians in the ﬁrst weeks of war and perhaps 25,000–30,000 Ukrainians
during its campaign in Galicia.183 Nor was such bloodshed conﬁned to the armed
forces of conservative monarchies. The French Republic’s military both shot
and took hostage noncombatants during its brief occupation of Alsace-Lorraine.184
Arguments seeking to place the atrocities of the kaiser’s army in Belgium and
northern France within a narrative of German exceptionalism are therefore
much misguided. Violence against civilians was a European way of war in Au-
gust 1914.
How then did these international atrocities of 1914 relate to the rest of Europe’s
bloody twentieth century? The tsarist force’s brutality, more than that of its
German opponent, does hint at some continuities with the exterminatory warfare
practiced three decades later in central and eastern Europe. Its deportations can
182 These proportions of damaged habitations are calculated from ofﬁcial ﬁgures in
Traba, “Wschodniopruskość,” 32, and Hesse and Goeldel, Bevölkerung von Ostpreußen,
2.
183 See Gumz, Resurrection and Collapse, 58, and Mick, Kriegserfahrungen, 72. Also,
Anton Holzer,Das Lächeln der Henker: Der unbekannte Krieg gegen die Zivilbevolkerung
1914–1918 ðDarmstadt, 2008Þ, esp. 46–53, 62–65, and 72–81.
184 Becker and Krumeich,Der Grosse Krieg, 178–79. A German ofﬁcial investigation,
whose results should however be treated with caution, found that over 3,000 Alsace-
Lorrainers not eligible for military service had been deported or evacuated by the French
army during the war. See Johannes Bell, ed., Völkerrecht im Weltkrieg: Dritte Reihe im
Werk des Untersuchungsausschusses, 5 vols. ðBerlin, 1927Þ, 1:168.
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plausibly be set in a continuum stretching from imperial colonization practices to
the punitive and security displacements ordered by Stalin in the Second World
824 WatsonWar. Moreover, Russian conduct, unlike that of the Germans, testiﬁes to the
murderous potential of racialized thinking already in the early twentieth century.
Ethnic stereotyping made a crucial difference to the dynamics of violence that the
recent focus on “military culture” has ignored or underplayed. In the German
case, the imperial army’s imaginary francs-tireurs were race-neutral. The delu-
sion’s indistinctness actually accentuated its danger initially, as not only French
but also Belgian and even Polish and Jewish civilians fell victim to it, but it also
enabled its rapid abandonment.185 The tsarist army differed in imparting ﬁxed
racial characteristics to the spies that it so feared. This contributed to the persis-
tence of that fear and encouraged radicalized countermeasures, culminating in the
deportation of entire suspect communities. In 1914–15, it was the Russian
military, not the kaiser’s force, that more closely preempted the NaziWehrmacht’s
unstoppable scripts of irrational, racialized violence.
Even so, the parallels should not be drawn too closely. As Peter Holquist has
argued, both structural and political checks, including government intervention as
well as domestic and international criticism, prohibited any possible slide by the
Russian army from deportation into genocide in 1915.186 Moreover, the shedding
of civilian blood on the battleﬁeld in 1914, driven principally by fear, was every-
where still far from the ideologically fueled and hate-inspired killing of 1941–45.
East Prussia’s experience shockingly illustrates the latter’s far greater lethality.
The imperial Russian army’s violence at the start of the First World War killed
less than a tenth—or three-tenths if deportation fatalities are included—of a
single percentage point of the province’s population. The Soviet army’s invasion
of East Prussia in January 1945 involved, by contrast, a truly terrifying level of
murder, rape, and destruction. As many as 311,000 civilians, 12.5 percent of the
prewar inhabitants, perished through exposure, starvation, massacres, and
deportation.187
The greatest signiﬁcance of atrocities in East Prussia, as in the west, may thus
lie less in what they presaged than in their immediate, impressive power to
mobilize. Internationally, East Prussian suffering never could compete for atten-
tion with that of the Belgians. This was partly inevitable: the plight of a region
belonging to a belligerent power was always going to attract less sympathy than a
neutral country invaded. It was also a consequence of the late and unimpressive
185 For Polish and Jewish victims, see Laura Engelstein, “‘A Belgium of Our Own’:
The Sack of Russian Kalisz, August 1914,”Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian
History 10 ð2009Þ: 441–73.
186 Holquist, “Les violences de l’armée russe,” 191–219.
187 Kossert, Ostpreußen, 330. See also Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Ger-
many: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949 ðCambridge, MA, 1995Þ,
esp. 71–76, and Merridale, Ivan’s War, 260–77.
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atrocity report issued by the German Foreign Ofﬁce and of the fact that the list of
obscure villages and towns emptied or destroyed by the Russians yielded no
Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia 825single, deﬁning outrage able to capture neutral foreigners’ imagination so well as
the ravaging of Louvain and burning of its university’s priceless library. In
Germany, however, Russian brutality in East Prussia made an immense impact.
The First World War was, historians have noted, “the ﬁrst media war.”188 News-
papers were extremely important in transmitting the province’s suffering to the
Reich’s population. So, by spreading refugees and evacuees across the country
and by carrying post back from the front, were the railways—another institution
integral to modern society. The German people as a whole underwent a vicarious
invasion in 1914–15, which generated feelings of shock, fear, and anger so
intense that state propaganda could still appeal to them in 1917 as it sought to
steel the exhausted nation to hold out. In this sense too, the Russian atrocities in
East Prussia were for contemporaries, if not for historians today, far from
“unheard-of brutality.” Widespread knowledge of the violence, by reinforcing
popular understanding of the conﬂict as a necessary, defensive struggle and
underpinning patriotic solidarity behind Hindenburg, played a central role in
mobilizing Germans to ﬁght the First World War.188 Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War ðLondon, 1998Þ, 212.
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